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ABSTRACT

This paper is a study of Spanish participation in the American Revolution, especially
with reference to Spain’s discrete territorial goals in that struggle. For most participants, the
war was about many things besides American independence, but the Spanish government of
King Charles HI viewed it almost exclusively as an opportunity to recover possessions lost
to Britain over several centuries. From Madrid’s perspective, the American rebels and their
aspirations were merely an unpleasant distraction.
Spain’s single-minded focus on conquering and bargaining for territory shaped her
actions in the military, naval, economic, and diplomatic spheres. This thesis explores how
Madrid coordinated all the elements of Spanish national policy in the service of acquiring as
much territorial compensation as possible from Spain’s four-year participation in the war.
Contemporary observers could not understand how the Spaniards, already masters of
the world’s largest empire, could maintain their insatiable appetite for land when many of their
existing domains were thinly settled and barely controlled. Spain seemed to believe that land
itself was power, as much as military strength or trade could be.
In a geopolitical sense—the one that mattered most to Madrid— Spain was
undoubtedly a victor in the American Revolution, winning back the Floridas and Minorca
from Britain while deflecting numerous attacks on her extensive empire. But that victory was
bittersweet. The fondest hope of Spanish revanchists, the Rock of Gibraltar, held out against
the fiercest military, naval, and diplomatic assaults that the combined Bourbon forces could
muster. The Spanish leadership’s dissatisfaction with the war’s outcome, despite Spain’s
outward success, shows its appreciation that it is not land per se, but the right land, that
makes all the difference.

TERRITORIAL MADNESS:
SPAIN, GEOPOLITICS, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Prologue:
CASTLES AND LIONS

February 12, 1781—
Sunrise heralded yet another frigid day on the southeastern shore of Lake Michigan.
The winter of 1781 was already the coldest in memory, but the forty-nine inhabitants of St.
Joseph, a British trading post overlooking a river of the same name, were more grateful than
annoyed. Their village, designated Fort St. Joseph in military parlance, had fallen prey to
French marauders from distant Cahokia only two months earlier. The grip of winter promised
at least temporary relief from further depredations.
Inside fifteen buildings crowded within the palisades, the people of St. Joseph were
asleep. Most of them were French Canadians or metis who made their living from the Indian
fur trade. Two hundred Indians lived nearby, most of them Potawatomis, all tributaries of the
British. This morning the fort was well stocked, a sizable shipment of maize having arrived
from Detroit in anticipation of a spring campaign against American and French settlements
to the south.1
As military outposts go, Fort St. Joseph was remarkable only for its anonymity. Even
General Haldimand in Quebec considered it a “remote Quarter”—quite a tribute in a region
as sparsely populated as the Illinois territory. As a trip-wire to warn Detroit against attacks
from enemy-held Vincennes, Cahokia, Kaskaskia or St. Louis, the fort had a certain value,
but seldom enough to warrant a garrison of more than eight British troops, its full contingent
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but seldom enough to warrant a garrison of more than eight British troops, its foil contingent
this morning.2
At seven o’clock, on the opposite bank of the ice-covered river, 125 men with quite
different loyalties shouldered their muskets. They had camped here the previous night, seven
miles west of the fort, after a river voyage and a twenty-day, three-hundred-mile overland
march. Among them were sixty-five European militiamen from St. Louis and Cahokia, led
by Captain Eugenio Poure. The rest were Indian allies, mostly Milwaukees whose leader, El
Hetumo, had persuaded the commandant of St. Louis to organize the expedition.3
The motives of these two groups differed radically. In a dramatic reversal of previous
attitudes, the Indians wanted plunder at St. Joseph, the whites revenge. In May 1763, only
two years after its transfer from French to British possession, the fort had been caught in the
sweep of Pontiac’s Rebellion, in a raid that left ten of the fourteen-man garrison dead and the
rest prisoners. Since that time the local Indians had been quiescent, content to let St. Joseph
exist as a trade depot, nothing more. So had it remained until the American Revolution drew
France and other European powers into its vortex. In mid-1778 three hundred Frenchmen
and Indians seized and burned the fort, but the British soon rebuilt it.4
Recent months had seen the Illinois country convulsed by raids and reprisals on both
sides. St. Louis suffered sixty-eight killed on May 26, 1780, in a British attack which was
thrown back only by Colonel George Rogers Clark’s timely arrival with five hundred
American reinforcements. Cahokia repelled a similar assault the same day; and as some
traced the origin of both attacks to Fort St. Joseph, the post suddenly acquired a strategic
importance disproportionate to its size.5
In the autumn, a party o f seventeen Cahokians under Jean Baptiste Hamelin had struck
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back in an expedition devoted primarily to looting. Reaching St. Joseph while the local
Indians were away on a hunt, the raiders had surprised the defenders and carried off goods
worth 62,000 livres—and then their luck ran out. For they had paroled and released their
twenty-two British captives, who promptly fell on them as they made their way home. In the
woodland skirmish that ensued on December 5, only three Cahokians escaped death or
capture.
The report of British treachery carried by those survivors sparked a cry in St. Louis
and Cahokia for militia to make a second attempt, the one which would meet its fate today.6
So vengeance was uppermost in the minds of the Europeans in this band as they studied the
fort silhouetted against the morning sun. Stealthily the group crossed the frozen river, leaving
behind their five pack-horses and camp supplies. The Potawatomis in and around St. Joseph
were strangely passive, pledged to neutrality the previous night by the raiders’ promise of half
the booty collected from British stores.
If the sentries were at their posts they were surely asleep, for the approach o f the
invaders brought no warning shots from the fort’s ramparts. Rushing the gate, Indians and
whites swarmed inside the high walls. They rapidly overpowered the sleepy British regulars,
taking their leader Duguiet and his seven troops prisoner with hardly a struggle. As the
palisades enclosed a space of only two acres, the inhabitants had nowhere—as in
December—to mount a proper defense. The crackle of scattered musket-fire split the
morning silence, but not one attacker was hit. Merchants, women, or children who took
cover indoors were quickly flushed out by the Indians and bundled, shivering, out to the
middle of the stockade.7
As the invaders looted the fort’s warehouses, they divided the plunder between the
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attacking Indians and the local Potawatomies. On Poure’s orders, the white raiders took
nothing for themselves; they had enough difficulty, they reported later, restraining their
Indians “from taking the lives of [all] the conquered, as they were barbarously accustomed
to do.”” Even so, two pro-British merchants who did try to flee were quickly overtaken and
killed by Milwaukee warriors.8 The expedition’s work was complete within hours.
At last, Poure commanded his soldiers with their prisoners to assemble in the fort’s
central square. Reading aloud in French a declaration of conquest, he proclaimed his
intention to “annex and join...this post of St. Joseph and its dependencies” to the dominions
of his sovereign, then ordered the Union Jack hauled down, to be replaced by a banner his
men had brought.9
To the amazement of the onlookers, however, the flag ascending the pole was not the
familiar fleur-de-lis of the French Bourbons. Instead, the castles and lions of Spain, bold
against a background of scarlet and yellow, fluttered alone atop the mast. The campaigning
season of 1781, last of the war in America, was begun in earnest...and the forces of Charles
III had struck the first blow.

Next day the Spaniards, after burning the excess stores and much of the fort as well,
slipped away with their captives in the direction of St. Louis. There they arrived on March
6, having executed their mission without the loss of a single man. At St. Joseph they left no
garrison. The British commander at Detroit, Major A. S. De Peyster, did not realize until a
month later that the raiders had been Spanish.10
* * *
As an isolated incident—a frontier foray, actually—in the American Revolution, this
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story cannot summarize Spain’s global role in that conflict. The daring initiative and
“spectacular success” of the St. Joseph expedition, for example, certainly did not typify
Spain’s wartime operations against Britain. Yet this episode does illustrate in microcosm the
most salient characteristics o f Spain’s conduct during her four-year participation in the war.
By its very nature, the attack on Fort St. Joseph was a hit-and-run raid par excellence.
But it was only one of many. Nowhere in the vast arena of the war did Spain opt for pitched
battles when shock tactics would serve her interests as well. Conducted on land and sea alike,
her surprise attacks sometimes flouted British and French notions of martial honor, but they
consistently proved an effective means of reconciling Spain’s limited military capabilities with
her expansionist war aims.
The conception and planning of the St. Joseph mission also characterized Spanish
policy in the American war. In an age of slow, unreliable communications, all states had to
allow local commanders some autonomy, but Spain outdid both her allies and enemies in this
regard. Just as Governor Francisco Cruzat in St. Louis authorized this 1781 expedition at the
urging of El Hetumo, left the tactical details to Captain Poure, and obtained the approval of
his superiors in New Orleans and Madrid only after the fact, so too did Spanish officers act
independently in Central America, in the West Indies, even in the Mediterranean where the
influence of Madrid was strong.11
Third, the geopolitical implications of Spain’s attack on St. Joseph far outweighed the
military significance of the operation itself. When he authorized the raid, Governor Cruzat
had no idea that Poure’s ‘conquest’ would form the basis for far-reaching Spanish claims to
the Northwest Territory at the Paris peace negotiations of 1782; yet that is precisely what
Madrid made of it. The Spanish court’s announcement of the attack in the Gaceta de Madrid
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of March 12, 1782 elicited a cynical response from the American envoys in Europe. John Jay
urged Congress to “consider the ostensible object of this expedition, the distance of it, the
formalities with which the place, the country, and the river were taken possession of in the
name of his Catholic majesty,” in declaring its objection to Spain’s pretensions to sovereignty
over the St. Joseph region. Benjamin Franklin agreed wholeheartedly.12 Considering that
Spain possessed barely enough power to control the territories she already owned, her ploy
of amassing bargaining chips to barter when peace talks began was patently obvious to all.
Yet she persisted in this practice, and conquest without control remained a Spanish trademark
throughout the war.
Fourth, the St. Joseph raid was preemptive: Cruzat wished to forestall further attacks
on Spanish Illinois by destroying Britain’s advanced posts and intimidating her Indian allies.13
Preemption was the keynote of Spanish policy from the start and around the globe, for fear
dictated much of Spain’s behavior in the American Revolution. Ruling the largest territorial
empire in the world without the manpower or ships to defend it properly, Spain felt herself
vulnerable to the power that Great Britain wielded on both land and sea. The logical response
to this perceived imbalance was to strike before the enemy marshaled enough forces locally
to resist—a tactic so effective that, when executed properly, it never failed Spain over four
years; so utterly necessary that Spanish forces only once triumphed without it.14
Finally, in conducting the St. Joseph raid, Spanish officials craftily employed the
minuscule force at hand to secure apparently substantial gains with no losses on their own
side. Time and again in America, Spain used campaigns like this one to wage the most costeffective war of any combatant in the American Revolution. For a state whose resources
were severely constrained from the outset, such economy was vital not only to Spain’s
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ultimate success in 1783, but also to her imperial survival before that time.
* * *
The intent of this essay is to explore Spanish participation in the American Revolution
in the context of global interests. Whether Spain’s contribution to American independence
was crucial, as some scholars contend—or even significant, as others deny—is not at issue
here.15 Whatever the future impact of her policy during this period, one aspect of Spain’s
involvement commands attention. Geopolitics is the equating of territory with power, and
Spain’s interests in the American Revolution, and the means by which she pursued them, were
all geopolitical in the extreme.
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IN AT THE KILLING:
Spanish Military and Naval Policy to 1778

I will not dissimulate, Sire, that the views and pretensions of Spain are
gigantic.
Comte de Vergennes to Louis XVI,
December 5, 17781

As King of Spain and the Indies since 1759, Charles III did not need a painful lesson
driven home twice before he grasped its meaning. So when the news of Lexington and
Concord reached Madrid on June 27, 1775, Charles’s first thought was of anything but
involvement in an Anglo-American struggle.2 The last time Spain had fought Britain, in the
Seven Years’ War, her defeat had been decisive and frighteningly rapid. In less than seven
months’ combat the Spaniards had lost two valuable overseas colonies and failed dismally in
their attempt to conquer neighboring Portugal, a British ally.
Spain’s sorry performance in this earlier struggle was a crucial factor in Charles’s
decision to wait before joining his nephew, Louis XVI of France, in reaping the spoils of
Britain’s colonial difficulties in 1779. For ties of blood had led him into the fiasco of 1762
in the first place.
French fortunes were on the wane in both Europe and America in 1761, and Charles
had vacillated for months before renewing the Bourbon ‘Family Compact’ on August 15 of
that year. He did so out of fear that with France’s fleet prostrate before Britain, Spain and
her empire would be the next targets of British aggression. Though embattled Britain had
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deferred a preemptive war declaration against Spain earlier—leading Prime Minister William
Pitt to resign in fury—Britain took the plunge on January 4, 1762.3
The Bourbon powers promptly invited Portugal to join their alliance, but her chief
minister, the Marquis de Pombal, opted for a neutrality tinged with pro-British leanings.
Madrid’s response was drastic: in April 1762 a Spanish army o f40,000 men invaded Portugal.
Led by the Conde de Aranda and reinforced by 8,000 French troops, the Spaniards seized
Almeida, a border city, and overran northern Portugal, but an expeditionary force of only
6,000 British regulars blocked their descent on Lisbon. A minor foray in South America
gained for Spain the Brazilian post of Colonia del Sacramento and £4,000,000 in booty, but
there Spanish luck ended. The army in Portugal, stalemated and wasted by disease, withdrew
in the autumn. Meanwhile, two catastrophes abroad brought Spain’s war to a shattering
close.4
Havana was Spain’s principal naval and military base in the New World. This, along
with her fame as ‘Queen o f the Indies,’ rendered her a natural magnet for enemy operations
in time of war. Britain, her naval prowess at a peak in 1762, landed a 10,000-man army near
Havana early in June. This massive amphibious attack was led by the Earl of Albemarle, a
lieutenant general, with George Eliott (the future defender of Gibraltar) second in command.
Their objective was a huge citadel—reputedly impregnable—called El Morro castle. If El
Morro fell, Havana and all Cuba would collapse with it. Albemarle called in reinforcements
from New York.
For forty-five days Don Luis de Velasco and El Morro’s 17,600 defenders held out,
but on July 30 the British took the fortress by storm. On August 13, Governor Don Juan de
Prado surrendered Havana, twelve warships, and £737,000 in prize money. Word of the
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city’s capture led one Sardinian envoy to ridicule Spain’s war effort as “more burning than
brilliant.”5 But worse news was to follow.
Halfway around the world, the Philippine base of Manila had long been famous
throughout Europe for its legendary riches. Furthermore, the British East India Company
feared that Spanish ships from Manila could interdict its China trade at will. So Company
officials persuaded the British government in January 1762 to marshal a force of regulars and
sepoys in India for an attack on the Philippines.6 Sailing from Madras on August 1, the
British contingent o f2,300 men under General Sir William Draper arrived in Manila Bay on
September 23 and quickly established a beachhead. Their landing benefited immeasurably
from Manila’s complete ignorance that Spain was now at war with Britain. The acting
governor of Manila, Archbishop Rojo, and a mixed force of defenders resisted stubbornly for
twelve days, but British naval strength carried the city in the end, as Rear-Admiral Samuel
Cornish’s eleven warships and three Company vessels unleashed an artillery barrage that
wrecked Manila’s fortress defenses. Redcoats and sepoys poured into the breach, and Rojo
surrendered Charles Ill’s jewel of the East on October 7, 1762.7
Fortunately for Spain, the news of Manila’s capture did not reach Europe until after
the definitive Treaty of Paris was signed on February 10, 1763. Thus Britain forfeited her
conquest—despite ongoing British claims to the balance of a $4,000,000 ransom agreed to
by Archbishop Rojo.8 However, Draper’s advertisement o f Spanish weakness in the
Philippines made Spain increasingly fearful for the archipelago’s security, to the point that
even rumors of British designs on Manila in 1779 would help to push Madrid toward a
declaration of war in that year.
*

sic

He

12
So it was that Spain, having met disaster in two hemispheres and reached a humiliating
stalemate in Portugal, joined France on the loser’s side of the 1763 Treaty of Paris. By that
settlement, Spain relinquished the Caribbean islands of Grenada, St. Vincent, and Tobago,
and even handed back recently-captured Minorca. She also gave up her historic claims to the
Newfoundland fisheries and agreed to allow British logwood cutters on the coast of Belize.
In exchange for Havana, Britain demanded and received Florida, thus acquiring a long
shoreline on the Gulf of Mexico.9
The previous November, by the secret Treaty of Fontainebleu, Louis XV had made
Charles III a gift of western Louisiana and the then ‘island’ of New Orleans.

This

cession—clearly a compensation for Spanish losses incurred on France’s behalf in the
war—gave Spain a buffer insulating New Spain from the British domains to the east, but in
strategic terms it could never replace Florida.10
Beaten and vengeful, Spaniards bided their time for the next several years. The later
1760s were marked by a colonial tax revolt in Quito in 1765 (ironically concurrent with
Britain's proclamation of the Stamp Act in North America) and the 1766 ‘Squillace riots’ in
Madrid on the question of social reform.11
A decade of military reescalation opened for Spain in 1770. Fittingly, that very year
featured a showdown during which Charles’s court redefined and took steps to achieve its
geopolitical objectives. Spain’s opponent in this duel, predictably, was Britain, but the
unexpected flashpoint was a desolate, windswept whaling station in the South Atlantic—the
Falkland (or Malvinas) Islands. In 1765 Lord Egmont, for whom the chief British settlement
there was named, called the Falklands “the key to the whole Pacific Ocean.” Both London
and Madrid knew their potential as a British stepping-stone into that ocean, which had
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hitherto been Spain’s private preserve.12
The instigator of the Falklands crisis was Francisco Bucareli, the saber-rattling
Spanish governor of Buenos Aires. Acting on an earlier suggestion from Madrid, Bucareli
had been harassing British patrols near Port Egmont for several months when, in June 1770,
he dispatched 1,400 men with six vessels to seize the post.
His massive show of force proved superfluous. Don Juan Ignacio de Madariaga,
leading the landing detail on June 4, discovered that only twenty-five marines and a single
frigate defended Port Egmont. After firing a few volleys for honor’s sake, the garrison hastily
surrendered. Madariaga hauled them back to Buenos Aires with all their possessions.13
News of the incident reached Europe weeks later and set off a storm of protest
throughout Britain. Parliament and populace were equally furious at Spain’s impertinence,
although few Englishmen had ever heard of the Falklands before. The British court immedi
ately demanded that Madrid disavow Bucareli's action. It backed up this ultimatum by
ordering General Thomas Gage, the commander-in-chief in North America, to mobilize 1,000
redcoats at Pensacola in West Florida, ready to move against New Orleans should war break
out.14
The Conde de Aranda, now president of the royal council in Madrid, was eager for
a fight. But his king, though burning with the same war fever, could not take on Britain
without French backing. Tension grew as Charles awaited France’s reaction. Meanwhile, the
Spanish council drew up plans to attack British-held Florida, Jamaica, the Mosquito Coast,
and the Bay of Honduras. It also voted reinforcements for Havana, Panama, and Veracruz;
but tellingly, no resources were directed to Louisiana. Its governor in New Orleans, Luis de
Unzaga, received orders to defend the city as best he could, but if pressed, to fall back to
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Mexico. Thus New Orleans residents witnessed the disheartening spectacle of their army
working as hard to improve its path of retreat as to strengthen the city's defenses.15
In Paris the anglophobic foreign minister, the Due de Choiseul, urged Louis XV
toward war, but the French king judged it neither the time nor the issue for the Bourbons to
force a reckoning with Britain. He wrote Charles a personal letter in December 1770,
begging his cousin to moderate his belligerent stance. “If Your Majesty can make some
sacrifice to preserve peace without injury to your honour, you will render a great service to
humanity and myself.”16
Clearly, if Spain brought on a war with Britain, she would have to wage it alone.
Charles bowed to the inevitable. On January 22 of the new year, his ambassador in London
delivered a note repudiating Bucareli's “violent enterprise” and promising to restore Port
Egmont to Britain. The crisis abated after a British landing party reoccupied the settlement
on September 15, 1771.17
In both France and Spain, the fallout from the Falklands crisis was swift and severe.
Choiseul fell from power in December 1770, his hawkish policy discredited for the moment,
and Aranda’s defeat followed in August 1773.18 Though Aranda became Spain’s principal
scapegoat for the affair, he was nevertheless a remarkable political animal. Already he had
wangled from Charles III the ambassadorship to Paris, where he began mending Bourbon
fences for the inevitable next crisis.19
Besides clarifying Spain's territorial priorities, the crisis o f 1770-1771 was significant
for its effect on Charles’s psyche. Feeling betrayed by Louis and humiliated over his
submission to Britain, the Spanish king vowed never again to sail in France’s diplomatic
wake.20 His resolution would keep Spain a spectator of the American Revolution, when it
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came, for more than four years.
Yet this incident did have one immediate (though unintended) effect on the American
colonies. The Boston Massacre was recent news in the summer of 1770, and the British
crown planned to deal harshly with Massachusetts in consequence. With the first report from
the Falklands, however, that matter instantly lost importance in London. Colonial Secretary
Lord Hillsborough sent instructions to Gage identifying Spain as by far the greater threat, and
by shifting forces to Florida to meet it, the British general defused much of the tension in
Boston.21
Five years later, Britain's attention was riveted on another Spanish escapade, this time
in Africa. On July 28, 1775, three days after the shocking news of Bunker Hill reached them,
Londoners learned that a Spanish army o f20,000 men under Irish-bom General Alexander
O’Reilly had attacked Algiers and had been repulsed with heavy losses.22
That grand assault, the brainchild of Spanish foreign minister the Marques de
Grimaldi, had been intended as a punitive expedition against the dey of Algiers, a known
conspirator with the notorious Barbary pirates. By striking at the pirates’ headquarters,
Grimaldi hoped to make the Mediterranean safe for European shipping.
By this, of course, he primarily meant Spanish shipping, which had recently suffered
heavy blows when the sultan of Morocco broke a 1767 treaty of friendship with Spain. The
sultan began aiding the pirates and also laid siege to Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish enclaves
in Morocco. Charles III sent relief parties to raise the sieges, which they did with such
success that Grimaldi decided to attempt Algiers. But through a leak in the Spanish cabinet
the dey was forewarned of the surprise attack, and O’Reilly’s troops had scarcely
disembarked on July 8 when Algerian forces set upon them and drove them back to their
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transports in disarray. The sheer magnitude of the fiasco toppled Grimaldi from power in
February 1777. He was replaced as foreign minister by Jose Moiiino, the Conde de
Floridablanca. This conservative, cynical Murcian was then little known but would become
the chief architect of Spain’s war effort in 1779. As for General O’Reilly, he narrowly
escaped being lynched on his return by an outraged Spanish public.23
Spain’s disaster before Algiers in 1775 was notable mainly because it brought
Floridablanca to power. The most disturbing legacy the new minister inherited from Grimaldi
was a mini-war with Portugal over South American borders.
* * *
The “Undeclared War” of 1774-1777 was not really of Spain’s making. From
Madrid’s perspective, the villain of the piece was Portugal’s aggressive, anglophilic prime
minister, the Marquis de Pombal. On the pretext of rectifying some territorial grievances left
over from the Seven Years’ War, Pombal in 1774 had ordered Portuguese troops in Brazil
to cross the Spanish frontier near the La Plata River (into what is now Uruguay) and occupy
land formerly associated with the Spanish Jesuits. He was able to carry off this coup because
Portugal had more troops committed to the La Plata region, and five ships of the line there
to Spain’s one.
Pombal anticipated Spanish military retaliation by turning again to Britain in
November 1775 in hopes o f support. But Britain, her army heavily committed in America,
could not afford another war on Portugal’s behalf. Realizing this, Grimaldi had already made
a proposal to the French in October. Spain had a long-standing interest in conquering
Portugal and unifying the Iberian peninsula; she had in fact done so once before, under Philip
II in 1580. Suddenly Grimaldi had a ready-made excuse to try again, so he assured French
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foreign minister Charles Gravier, the Comte de Vergennes, that in exchange for French aid
in crushing Portugal, Spain would help France to seize Brazil for herself24 South America
would become a Bourbon fortress.
A French-ruled Brazil was Grimaldi’s idea, not Vergennes’. Had France subscribed
to Spain’s habit of equating land-holding with politico-military power, Vergennes might have
taken the bait. But the French had bowed out of the territorial game in 1763, and now their
geopolitical focus was on strategic points rather than vast expanses with indefensible frontiers.
Vergennes also worried that an all-Spanish peninsula would raise Spain’s power and prestige
above that o f France. Finally, the news of General Howe’s smashing victory over the
Americans at Long Island in August 1776 convinced him that Britain still had teeth and that
war with her—inevitable if the Bourbons invaded Portugal again—was ill-advised at that
time. France still awaited the proper moment to strike, and on learning of Britain’s desire to
settle the Portuguese crisis peacefully, Vergennes indicated that he shared that wish, though
“rather from necessity than inclination.”25
V

So Vergennes declined to support Spain, couching his retreat in suitably vague terms:
“The king [Louis XVI] will always regard the aggrandizement of the Spanish monarchy with
satisfaction,” he wrote in November 1776, “but...the conquest of Portugal would be alarming
to all states interested in maintaining the balance of power.”26 Madrid cared nothing for
European equilibrium in any case, so France’s posture appeared there as pusillanimous as it
had been in 1770. But both Grimaldi and the even more bellicose Aranda in Paris now
recognized that Spain would have to confine hostilities to South America.
One of Grimaldi’s last official acts was to order the sailing of two fleets against the
Portuguese. One hovered outside Lisbon, the other left Cadiz in November 1776, bound for
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Buenos Aires. This second Spanish convoy o f thirteen warships and 9,300 troops under
General Pedro Cevallos annihilated Portugal’s occupying force on the La Plata and quickly
recovered the post o f Sacramento at the river’s mouth. When Cevallos also captured
Portugal’s strategically important island of Saint Catherine further north, the Portuguese
hastily signed an armistice in June 1777.27
Back in Lisbon, King Joseph I had died on February 24, 1777. His successor, Maria
I, was a niece o f Charles III. She dismissed Pombal on March 5 in favor of the more
conciliatory Marquis de Angeja, who negotiated with Floridablanca for a formal peace.
Spanish diplomacy hit its eighteenth-century high in the resultant Treaty o f The Prado (March
24, 1778), which completed the work begun by the Treaty of San Ildefonso the previous
October.28 Besides resolving some thorny territorial controversies,29 these pacts bound Spain
and Portugal not to make war or contract alliances detrimental to the other’s interests. Of
greatest import for the American Revolution, however, was an article stipulating that if one
of the signatories became entangled in a war—any war—the other must remain scrupulously
neutral in it.30
Overnight, Spain’s foreign policy became more pacific. Easing a European posture
that, in 1776, had been far more belligerent than either France’s or Britain’s (though the latter
was then already at war), Spain by 1778 was playing hard-to-get. She could now listen as the
combatants in the American war bid for her friendship or neutrality, always with offers of
territory, as her lust for land was well known to all her petitioners. The Portuguese conflict
had cost Spain little in blood or treasure, but by its outcome Floridablanca had guaranteed her
position with respect to Portugal in the event of war with Britain.31 Given a nearly continuous
history of Anglo-Spanish hostility since the sixteenth century, there were good odds that this
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insurance would soon pay dividends. As it turned out, Spain needed it the very next year.
*

sje *

French statesmen tried a variety of tactics to lure Spain into the American war on
France’s side. But in addition to diplomatic inducements to join the fight against Britain, a
skeptical Spanish court required military evidence that Spain’s intervention could be both
decisive and profitable. The needed proof came in a seemingly inconclusive naval action,
France’s first real battle of the war.
On the French side, the Comte d’Orvilliers commanded a fleet of thirty-two ships of
the line, cruising out of the port o f Brest. His British opponent, Admiral Augustus Keppel,
sailed from Portsmouth on July 9, 1778 with the Home Fleet of twenty-four ships, later
increased to thirty. Fearing that Spain’s entry into the war was imminent, Lord North in
London hoped that Keppel could force an engagement with the French, win it, and thereby
frighten Spain into neutrality.32
The two fleets met sixty-six miles west of the Isle of Ushant, near the mouth of the
Channel. After four days of maneuvering, Keppel forced the hesitant d’Orvilliers into battle
on July 27.33 The latter had orders not to bring on a general action, but finding himself
engaged, he employed a new French battle tactic. As Keppel told it afterward, “The object
of the French was at the masts and rigging, and they have crippled the fleet in that respect
beyond any degree I ever before saw.”34 Neither side sank any enemy vessels, though
casualties were high all around (508 British, 736 French).35 Despite his tactical success,
d ’Orvilliers failed to press his advantage and returned to Brest. Both admirals claimed
victory, yet neither side won a lasting strategic edge at Ushant.
“A pretty smart skirmish” was naval historian A. T. Mahan’s later assessment of the

20
battle. In spite of its ambiguous outcome (Keppel’s ships suffered far worse damage, but he
held the ‘field’ in the end), the battle of Ushant was as pivotal for Spain in 1778 as Saratoga
had been for France the previous year. Two aspects of the clash impressed Spaniards deeply.
First, Keppel’s fleet had failed to defeat a French squadron in equal combat, which raised
hopes in both Paris and Madrid that Spanish naval power would tip the balance in the
Bourbons’ favor. Second, Vergennes realized that standoffs like Ushant were the best that
France could achieve unaided, so he began sweetening his earlier offers to entice Spain into
the war.36
This proved a straightforward task for the French minister because his options were
so limited. The Spaniards had made it clear that humbling Britain and helping America were
objects which held no charm for them. Without Vergennes’ guarantee that Charles III would
expand his imperial holdings as a result o f the war, Spain simply refused to fight.

BIDDING FOR COUNTERS:
Diplomacy and the Spanish Navy, 1775-1779

The Spaniards are a little like children. They can be interested only by
presenting shining objects to their gaze.
Montmorin to Vergennes,
February 26, 17781

Spanish leaders paid little attention to the American Revolution when it began in 1775.
Madrid’s leading newspaper devoted only one sentence to the news of the United States’
Declaration of Independence.2 And King Charles El abhorred the very idea of a free republic
in the New World. How, then, did Spain become a major participant in a world war over the
future of Britain’s American colonies?
The answer depended principally on how Madrid hoped to profit by that war in the
currency it knew best: territory. With the British empire collapsing from within, never had
the time seemed more propitious for Spain to settle old scores. “Spain has treasures which
she must redeem,” urged ambassador the Conde de Aranda from Paris. “This chance will
hardly return while the world shall last.”3
Scon after the opening clash at Lexington and Concord in April 1775, leading
Spaniards began pondering how they could best turn Britain’s colonial troubles to their
advantage. Foreign Minister Grimaldi, like his Frerich counterpart Vergennes, secretly
rejoiced that the Americans had revolted. In his official correspondence, however, Grimaldi
sympathized openly with Lord North’s ministry, and by January 1776 he was complaining that
21
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Britain had not sent an army of respectable size to crush the rebellion.4
In that same month, Thomas Paine electrified America with the publication of
Common Sense, in which he insisted that “France and Spain never were...our enemies as
Americans, but as our being the subjects of Great Britain.” However, his assessment was true
of France alone. For Spain’s king and council regarded the colonists with a suspicion and fear
that were no less real than their hatred of the English.5 Their anti-American sentiments had
both philosophical and geopolitical roots. Spanish statesmen instinctively condemned any
uprising against monarchical rule, and, more to the point, they worried how this particular
war might threaten their empire’s territorial integrity.
Because Vergennes had worked closely with Grimaldi since 1774, the French minister
knew intuitively of Madrid’s concerns. Citing Spanish “anxiety as to what is happening in
America,” Vergennes presented to the French cabinet in March 1776 some “Considerations
on the Affair of the English Colonies” there. The Bourbon courts should desire the war’s
continuation in order to exhaust both combatants, he reasoned, since the eventual outcome
was fraught with danger no matter which side prevailed. Should Britain subdue the rebels,
she might then turn on French and Spanish colonies to recover the costs of the war, or to re
establish Anglo-American union with a campaign to plunder Bourbon riches. Conversely, an
American victory could lead the colonists to become “conquerors from necessity,”
overrunning the Spanish Main and French sugar islands to capture markets for their goods.
In either event, Vergennes concluded, Providence had marked England for humiliation after
a century of tyrannizing her neighbors; and the Bourbons must speed her decline by means
of “secret favours” to the Americans to prolong the war.6
His hatred of Britain undimmed after fifteen years, Aranda envisioned an identical
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scenario and urged both Paris and Madrid to shore up their Caribbean defenses. Though
Grimaldi ignored this unsolicited counsel, he concurred with Vergennes’ plan of covert
assistance to the rebels. On June 27, 1776, he initiated a Spanish loan of one million livres
to the colonists, matching the sum advanced by France three weeks earlier. By August,
American agents were buying Spanish gunpowder in New Orleans.7
British officials quickly learned of this escalating Spanish aid to America, but chose
a non-confrontational response in view of Spain’s growing hostility toward their ally,
Portugal, over the La Plata occupation. Thus the Admiralty warned its anti-smuggling patrols
away from Spanish coastal waters, and the secretary of state downplayed those skirmishes
which occasionally flared up between British and Spanish warships. Their circumspection
was rewarded in October 1776 when the Spanish Council of State approved in principle a
French plan for war with Britain, but conditioned its agreement on Spain’s acquiring both
Portugal and Minorca in the peace settlement.8 France refused to fight Britain simply to
obtain Portugal for Spain, so the Spanish-Portuguese quarrel remained a limited war. Even
at this early date, Charles’s government sought to extort territory from France as the price
of alliance.
Meanwhile, General Howe’s army had driven the rebels from New York City.
Grimaldi’s ongoing policy o f crippling Britain by attrition led him to propose a new subsidy
for the Americans in December 1776 “to ensure that the war is prolonged.” His government
still looked on the colonists merely as a convenient tool with which to humble its enemy, but
they intended to become far more than that. Already in September, Congress had guaranteed
the safety of Charles ffl’s South American dominions from rebel intrusion. Now Americans
attracted the king’s support for an ambitious proposal: a rebel expedition would march on
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West Florida, seize Pensacola and the British settlements on the Mississippi, and then hand
them over to Spain once American independence was assured. To facilitate this peaceful
acquisition of a prized possession, Jose de Galvez, Spain’s minister of the Indies, instructed
his nephew Bernardo de Galvez, the new governor of Louisiana, to supply the Americans
with arms, munitions, and clothing.9 Spanish aid flowed more freely than ever.
Congress hoped to clear the way to even further assistance and eventually to formal
alliance with both Bourbon kingdoms. To this end its most famous member, Benjamin
Franklin, had sailed to France in October 1776 as commissioner with broad powers to treat
with that court. Three months later, Congress named him commissioner to Spain as well.
Franklin met with Aranda in Paris and pronounced the Spanish ambassador “well dispos’d
towards us,” but he did not anticipate Grimaldi’s ouster in February 1777.10 Once
Floridablanca took the reins of Spanish foreign policy, Aranda’s goodwill toward the United
States found little support in Madrid.
Aranda favored Spanish recognition of the United States, not out of any belief in
republican government, but because he sensed that America was destined to achieve
independence in the near future, whatever Spain might do. He likewise urged Madrid to ally
itself with the rebels, ip exchange for a mutual guarantee of each side’s territory in North
America. This was the only way to halt the encroachment of Anglo-American settlers upon
Louisiana and eventually New Spain itself, he argued.
But Floridablanca was deaf to Aranda’s pleas. He felt that American independence
could hurt Spain as badly as it would Britain, especially as an example to her own colonies.
While he lied as artfully as Grimaldi had done about Spain’s desire for harmonious relations
with her longtime enemy, Floridablanca did see the potential for territorial gain if Madrid
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could keep open a line of communication to London.11 Perhaps Spain could recover some
important irredenta, yet avoid the expense and danger of war, if she ignored the colonists and
dealt strictly with the British court. In Floridablanca’s eyes, the trick was to seize all one
could from a conflict whose central issue was American sovereignty, while simultaneously
denying the rebels’ existence as a nation. The Marques de Gonzalez Castejon, Spain’s
minister of marine, echoed Floridablanca’s feelings when he declared, “I think that we should
be the last country in all Europe to recognize My sovereign and independent state in North
America.”12
Yet Charles’s government would face that specter the very next month. Unaware of
the new drift in Spanish policy, Franklin delegated his colleague, Arthur Lee, to visit Spain
in March 1777 to lay the groundwork for negotiations on trade and possibly an alliance. Lee
carried a formal letter of introduction from Aranda, but Floridablanca, horrified that an
American envoy’s, presence in Madrid might imply Charles’s approbation of the rebellion, sent
the departing Grimaldi to intercept him. On March 4, Grimaldi met Lee at Burgos and
pledged renewed financial support to the rebels, explaining, “The Spanish court is convinced
that its dominions run much less danger if they have a commercial republic for a neighbour
than an ambitious monarch.” Of course, this was not Floridablanca’s position at all, but it
enabled Grimaldi to steer Lee gently back to France. In parting, the Spaniard added with a
straight face that his king had no appetite for territorial expansion, but that he would accept
Florida, the better to supply the Americans from Havana.13
Floridablanca’s rebuff of Lee convinced Franklin to postpone his own planned journey
to Spain. Instead, on April 7 he presented to Aranda a proposal of Congress dated December
30, 1776. In return for a Spanish declaration of war against Britain, the United States again
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promised to seize Pensacola for Charles III, adding a pledge to join Spain’s war on Portugal
and assist the Bourbons in conquering the British sugar islands. Aranda relayed this proposal
to Madrid, but his government made no reply.14
In a significant departure from its earlier offer, Congress now coupled its promise to
deliver Pensacola with a demand that Spain grant Americans the free navigation of the
Mississippi River. The summer of 1777 was to witness a sudden heightening of tensions
along that waterway, even without rebel participation. Ever since 1763, when Article VII of
the Treaty of Paris had declared the Mississippi open to navigation by the subjects o f both
empires occupying its banks, Britain and Spain had maintained an uneasy coexistence there.
But Bernardo de Galvez broke the truce. Soon after being named acting governor of
Louisiana, he began to confiscate British vessels on the river, charging that their crews were
carrying on “an illicit Trade” in his province. “By former resolutions and Laws of our Kings,”
Galvez insisted, “every Power knows that we did not admit Strangers into our America.” He
therefore brought several English captains to trial for smuggling. Although British officials
protested loudly and ships of the Royal Navy commenced firing on Spanish merchantmen near
New Orleans, Galvez refused to back down.15
These hostile encounters on the Mississippi might have given Madrid a casus belli in
late 1777, had the time been right in other respects. But Floridablanca thought Britain still
too powerful to engage directly and opted to continue Spain’s secret aid to the rebels. He
rejected a plea from Franklin, Lee, and Silas Deane for Spain to intervene with her fleet,
arguing;
Our great naval armament....is an efficacious and powerful defence for the
Colonies, and even in open warfare would not be more so, since in that case
we should have to distribute it according to the requirements of our own
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defence, while at present it threatens England exclusively, and defends the
Americans....The war into which those same [American] Deputies might wish
to plunge us inopportunely, might be more hurtful to them, by withdrawing
our forces to act in our own defence.16
On the same day, October 17, Burgoyne capitulated at Saratoga. The news reached Europe
in December, and within a week Vergennes launched his first full-scale effort to lure the
Spaniards into the war. Spain must act quickly, he wrote his ambassador in Madrid. Her
stake in the war’s outcome was ten times that of France, whose Caribbean islands were an
unlikely target for British greed: “They already have enough of that sort of thing; what they
want is treasure, and that is to be got only from the [Spanish] continent.” Besides, he added,
Spain might acquire Florida in the subsequent peace treaty.17
The Spanish royal council spent two sessions debating Vergennes’ proposition.
Eventually Floridablanca persuaded his king to delay overt hostilities, at least until Spain’s
treasure ships returned from Mexico in the spring of 1778. The Spanish minister had been
stung by Burgoyne’s defeat; he saw that it would lead to French belligerency on behalf of the
colonists. Then, when Britain retaliated indiscriminately against all Bourbon possessions,
Spain would be drawn into the fray. “If that happens,” Floridablanca warned French
ambassador the Comte de Montmorin, “we shall not be the first to wish for peace...Before
asking for it we must sell even our last shirt.” Nevertheless, Montmorin left secure in the
knowledge that “in whatever manner France is dragged into war, Spain will follow.” By
December 31,1777, Vergennes knew that Madrid would resist joining the war voluntarily.18
But if France took the lead, he guessed, she could induce Spain to fight in spite of herself.
* * *
“An approaching war with France and Spain appears now almost out of doubt,”
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declared Lord North as 1778 began. The British press had been saying as much since 1776,
and newspapers throughout the colonies for the past year, but none of them appreciated
Spain’s distrust of French motives.19 Montmorin reported from Madrid that Floridablanca
needed strong reassurance against the “instability” of Vergennes’ diplomatic projects, while
Charles III was similarly nervous about his nephew, Louis XVI. “I will always be his good
friend and ally,” the Spanish king told Montmorin, “but...I have many things to foresee and
many points to guard....it is not the same with Spain as with France.”20 The safety of its farflung possessions was thus Madrid’s chief concern as it tried to dissuade French leaders from
any rash gesture that would provoke open warfare with Britain. Accordingly, Charles and
Floridablanca overruled the bellicose Aranda and rejected France’s offer of a tripartite alliance
with her and the American rebels.
So Vergennes decided it was time for France to act alone. On February 6, 1778, only
two days after news of the Spanish refusal reached Paris, French representative ConradAlexandre Gerard and the American commissioners signed treaties of amity, commerce, and
alliance. Appended to these agreements was a separate article pledging both signatories to
work to bring Spain into their new partnership.21 Both France and Britain anticipated a quick
response from Madrid. But Floridablanca ridiculed the Franco-American pact as one “worthy
of Don Quixote” and made it clear that his government had no plans to recognize American
independence.22
Floridablanca’s resolve hardened over the next several months as reports arrived from
Philadelphia and New Orleans. His agent and unofficial observer, Juan de Miralles, had
landed at Charleston in January 1778 and journeyed to Pennsylvania to learn Congress’s
feelings toward Spanish land claims in the West. There he heard speakers call the Mississippi
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an American river—ignoring Spain’s possession of both banks at its mouth and Spanish
domination of the gulf into which it emptied. Miralles’s accounts of their presumptuousness
led Floridablanca, who in March had accepted the Mississippi as a logical Spanish-American
boundary, to view rebel claims to that river with increasing alarm. By the end of 1778 the
Spanish minister angrily opposed permitting Americans anywhere near the river which had
seemed an eminently reasonable Anglo-Spanish border for the past fifteen years.23
Recent events in New Orleans heightened Floridablanca’s fears about American
designs on the Mississippi, On January 11, 1778, rebel Captain James Willing had departed
Pittsburgh with twenty-seven men aboard the gunboat Rattletrap and glided downriver
toward New Orleans. Seizing loyalist ships and prisoners along the way, they plundered
$15,000 in British property. Finally they reached New Orleans and delivered dispatches to
Galvez, who in return lavished money and supplies on them and promised free transit through
Louisiana.24 As if this were not provocation enough for Britain, Galvez began courting the
Choctaw Indians near his capital in apparent expectation of future hostilities with West
Florida.25 Such inflammatory actions by its supposedly neutral governor upset Madrid no less
than London.
Clearly, events were conspiring to push Floridablanca toward war with Britain.
Although determined that Spain must benefit from her enemy’s internal dissension, the foreign
minister hoped to avoid an open conflict if possible. So he approached the British in 1778
with a proposal suggested by Aranda: that Britain should compensate Spain for her continuing
neutrality by “restoring” a coveted irredenta such as Gibraltar^ Jamaica, or Florida.
Gibraltar was Floridablanca’s chief objective from the outset.

In June 1778

Vergennes, knowing this, specified for the first time the territories that Spain might acquire
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by joining the Franco-American alliance and placed the Rock at the top of his list. But
Floridablanca doubted that France really wanted Gibraltar in Spanish hands and resolved to
continue his quest by diplomatic means. He sent a new ambassador, the Marques de
Almodovar, to London on a difficult mission.26
To the new Spanish envoy, “a man o f very slender abilities” in the eyes of British
diplomats, Floridablanca entrusted the ticklish job of convincing Britain to participate with
France in a Spanish-brokered mediation conference (because Spain did not recognize the
colonies’ sovereignty, the French would represent them). As even French diplomats looked
askance at this idea, it naturally found a cool reception in London.27 Lord North believed
Spain’s feelings toward Britain to be “almost as hostile as those of France,” and after the
battle of Ushant in July, George III hoped at best to keep the Spaniards quiet until the
following spring. By then, he anticipated, the British fleet would be a match for both
Bourbon navies.28
But Floridablanca’s government, undaunted, pressed on with its project.

On

September 28, 1778, the foreign minister sent to Almodovar a “Plan of mediation” which the
ambassador forwarded to the British Cabinet the following month. The document invited
both Britain and France to submit to Madrid their conditions for making a truce, which
Charles III would integrate into a comprehensive peace plan acceptable to all parties.
Floridablanca backed up this proposal with a veiled threat to open hostilities if the British
rejected such an opportunity.29 The noncommittal response the idea drew from both Paris and
London was surprising, for, by late autumn, Spain’s potential to shape the war’s outcome had
grown dramatically.
But her diplomatic posture remained as unfathomable as ever, at least with respect to
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America. Thus George Washington could speculate that Spanish intervention might make “a
very interesting change” in the course of the struggle even as his young subordinate,
Alexander Hamilton, was arguing that “[t]he sluggishness of Spain affords room to doubt her
taking a decisive part.” Across the Atlantic a better-placed observer, Montmorin, wrote
Vergennes to explain Madrid’s hesitation:
There is no concealing the fact that the interest they feel here in the Americans
is not very tender....Spain regards the United States as destined to become her
enemy in no remote future, and consequently, far from allowing them to
approach her possessions she would omit no precaution calculated to keep
them off.30
Unable to foment Spanish belligerency on the colonists’ behalf, Vergennes soon resumed
trying to entice Madrid with offers of territory. On December 5 he told Louis XVI that
“everything advises our risking something in order to bring this ally to the desired point of
reunion with us.” Here the Comte was playing directly into Floridablanca’s hands. The latter
intended to secure French support for Spain’s war aims by having Vergennes guarantee their
achievement in return for an alliance.31
Montmorin cautioned that Spanish involvement would alter the war to the detriment
of French interests, but Vergennes made a proposition to the Spaniards in December anyway.
In response, Floridablanca listed Spain’s “necessary” objectives—Gibraltar, West Florida, and
the entire Gulf of Honduras—while adding some “useful” ones such as Jamaica, Minorca, and
the eviction of British loggers from Campeche.32 Interestingly, he made no mention now of
the Mississippi.
But French sentiment about the river was steadily approaching the Spanish viewpoint
in any case. Vergennes, who had originally endorsed American territorial ambitions in the
West, now instructed Minister Conrad-Alexandre Gerard in Philadelphia to clarify France’s
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position for Congress and discourage American settlement beyond the Appalachians. Gerard
lectured a congressional committee in January 1779 that such expansion would be “totally
foreign to the principles of the [Franco-American] alliance,” adding that “the United States
had not the slightest right to the possessions of the King of England that did not equally
belong to the King of Spain when he was at war with England.” As to the war effort, he
finished, Spain would not join the allies as long as “so great a subject for jealousy” persisted
between them.33
Certain that his speech had made a strong impression on the delegates, Gerard
appeared before Congress again on February 15 to report that Spain wished to see America’s
territorial claims “terminated.” She also wanted the Floridas and the navigation of the
Mississippi for herself, he went on; and when someone accused Spain of land-grabbing, he
answered loftily, “His Catholic Majesty is too great and generous to desire an acquisition of
territory.”34 In the dispute between her old and new allies, France’s loyalties were all too
clear.
In these exchanges, Spain’s eventual belligerency was taken by all interested parties
to be a foregone conclusion. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hamilton, the lieutenant-governor
of Canada, spoke for many when he declared in January 1779, “I have no doubt at this minute
of the existence of a Spanish as well as French war.” Charles’s government was quite willing
to intercede, but not before its strategic and territorial demands were met in full. As young
Montmorin warned Vergennes in February, Spain’s diplomatic policy was “to exact
everything and accord nothing,” yet only by accepting Spanish terms could France secure
Madrid’s spirited cooperation.35
* * *
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Once war became imminent early in 1779, Floridablanca had cast about for a way to
humble Britain quickly, cheaply, and with minimum risk to Spain’s far-flung possessions.
Vergennes believed the aims of the Bourbons could best be achieved by assisting the
American colonists and by seizing Caribbean islands for use as bargaining chips.36 But two
considerations made this strategy unpalatable to the Spaniards. First, their chief objectives
(Gibraltar and Minorca) were in Europe, so Vergennes’ plan was too indirect; and second,
the idea of cooperating actively with rebels against established authority was philosophically
repugnant to them. Ushant had proven that France needed Spain’s naval aid, so Floridablanca
held the whip hand in any Franco-Spanish negotiations, and he knew it.
Floridablanca wanted to fight the war in British home waters and finish it quickly, for
if the focus of conflict shifted to America, Britain would be free to detach forces to assail the
widespread, vulnerable Spanish empire.37 His initial preference was a combined assault on
Ireland, which Spain could later exchange for Gibraltar. But although Vergennes had yielded
grudgingly to Floridablanca’s insistence on a European strategy, he rejected a descent on
Ireland in February 1779 on the grounds that Spain was unwilling to commit a single soldier
to the occupying force. In March, the two ministers decided that their combined armada
should concentrate on Portsmouth and Plymouth.38
* * *
Despite the ominous implication of these Bourbon discussions, Spanish policy
remained outwardly quiescent through March 1779. Britain’s George III, desperate for good
news, began to credit “the supposition that the Court of Spain will not take part in the War.”
But on April 3, Madrid dashed his hopes by issuing to the British ambassador an ultimatum
which “offered” again to mediate Britain’s differences with France.39 The core of the Spanish
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proposal was an immediate armistice to be followed by a long-term truce lasting up to twentyfive years, during which the “American Colonies” might be considered de facto independent.
Territorial ownership would be decided according to the principle of uti possidetis, with each
side keeping what its arms controlled. At this date, that meant that New York City, Rhode
Island, much of Georgia, and part of the Northwest would remain under British rule, leaving
the United States a scarcely viable agglomeration of provinces, intersected at key points by
ports bristling with warships of the Royal Navy.40
British statesmen, too, found small comfort in the proposal. It did offer peace, but
on terms laid out by a hated Bourbon regime with the prospect of Britain ultimately losing
most of her American empire anyway. And as before, Spain expected to receive Gibraltar
(and possibly Minorca as well) as compensation for her services as mediator. Thus her
proposition was no offer at all, in Britain’s view, but a case of blatant extortion. Fleet Street
trumpeted predictions of an inevitable war with Spain as the North ministry awaited the next
proof of Spanish antipathy.41
They had not long to wait, for Madrid acted before London could even reply. On
April 12, 1779 at Charles Ill’s summer palace in Aranjuez, Montmorin and Floridablanca
signed a Franco-Spanish convention laying out their nations’ aims in what both knew was a
coming clash with Britain. The pact called for Spain to declare war if Britain spumed her
offer of April 3, and for the Bourbons then to invade the British Isles. Floridablanca set out
Spain’s territorial objectives in great detail: Mobile, Pensacola, East Florida, and Minorca
were to be captured or secured by treaty, and the British were to be expelled from both the
Bay of Honduras and the Campeche coast. France promised to share Newfoundland’s
fisheries with Spain if she acquired the island, while asking that Charles III recognize

America’s independence and offer “not to set aside his arms until that independence is
recognized by the King of Great Britain.”42 Significantly, Vergennes knew Charles’s temper
well enough that he did not insist on the king’s acknowledgement of American sovereignty
as a precondition of the treaty. To have done so might have derailed the talks completely.
The most essential item of the convention from Madrid’s point of view, Article IX,
committed both parties to continue hostilities until Spain recovered Gibraltar.43 This was the
Spanish sine qua non for participation in the war; France had proffered several alternatives,
but to no avail. One troubling aspect of France’s guarantee of Gibraltar was its effect on her
prior commitment to the United States to fight until they won their freedom. This unilateral
change threatened to embroil the Americans in a protracted conflict to satisfy the ambitions
of a power which refused even to recognize their independence.
Thus the Convention of Aranjuez simultaneously activated the Bourbon Family
Compact and complicated France’s relations with her American allies.44 French diplomats
were vastly relieved at having lured Spain into the war, regardless of the cost, but Montmorin
reminded Vergennes that France’s allies were anything but friends themselves.

“We

ought...not [to] conceal from ourselves, Monsieur,” the ambassador wrote, “how little interest
Spain takes in the United States of America; we shall certainly have evidence of this in the
course of the war but especially when the question shall arise of concluding peace.” The
Spaniards and Americans had become co-belligerents, but nothing more, by Spain’s choice.45
To the Americans who pressed him for reasons why Spain had not joined the FrancoAmerican alliance, Gerard responded on May 27 that Charles III would continue to offer
mediation until London’s refusal “convinced [him] of the injustice of the views and of the
ambition of England.” At that point, he said, Spain would actively take up the allied cause.
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His words were prophetic. The very next day Floridablanca informed Aranda that the
moment had come to break with Britain.46
Unknown to Gerard, London had in fact rejected Charles’s mediation offer on May
4, and now the Bourbon fleets were ready to sail for the Channel A French war council on
June 12 designated Portsmouth as their principal objective. As the base of Britain’s Home
Fleet this port was strategically vital and, once captured, its restoration would certainly
warrant the cession of Gibraltar by Britain at future peace talks. George III worried that
“20,000 Men Landed in England and 10,000 in Ireland would cause great fear,” but the
French invasion force intended for Portsmouth actually numbered closer to 50,000.47
As if to quell any lingering doubts in Madrid, reports-of a British plan to seize the
Philippines began to trickle into the capital in June. Already Britain had attacked French posts
in the East Indies, and memories of the Manila fiasco of 1762 convinced Spanish officials that
the British could reconquer that city almost at will.48 Better to enter the war and conduct an
active defense, Madrid decided, than to stand by and watch the Philippines fall without a
struggle.
The prearranged signal for Spain to declare war was the sailing of d’Orvilliers’s
French squadron from Brest to rendezvous with the Spaniards. When news of his departure
on June 3 reached Paris, a courier left for England carrying a statement of Spanish grievances.
He reached London on June 10 and Spanish ambassador Almodovar handed the document
to Lord Weymouth, the British secretary of state, on June 16 and requested his passports.
Two days later Almodovar, with the sound o f the Dover forts’ twenty-seven-gun salute
echoing in his ears, crossed the Channel to Calais.49
British reaction to Spain’s announcement was mixed. The Duke of Richmond felt that
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it betokened a crisis “the most awful this country has ever experienced,” and in the Commons,
Opposition leader Edmund Burke called for Lord North’s impeachment as prime minister.
But the press was jubilant and the stock market rose strongly at the prospect of war with
Spain. “The fingering of their Gold,” as one Londoner wrote, “is no small object with a
commercial People.”50 Still, not even the staunchest optimist in Britain could deny that the
road to victory had turned decidedly steeper overnight.
The charade of Spanish neutrality was over. Now, perhaps, Spain’s fleet would
acquire for her what diplomacy had not.
* * *
Like many Spaniards, Floridablanca believed that a naval victory followed by invasion
of the British Isles would secure for Spain her cherished ends. Confidence in Spain’s navy
was high after the success of Cevallos’s expedition to Brazil in 1776.51 And on paper, there
was good reason for optimism. Spain entered the American Revolution with 131 warships of
all sizes (57 of them ships of the line), a fleet three times larger than it had been around
1700.52
This made Spain’s fleet the third largest in the world, and its addition to the FrancoAmerican war effort shattered British naval calculations. Ever since the 1690s Britain had
kept her fleet at least as strong as the combined forces of her rivals, giving her an eighteenthcentuiy ‘two power standard’ that was no less real than its more heralded successor in the
1890s. In 1779, however, that naval preeminence vanished before what George III called
“the unexpected magnitude” of Bourbon seapower. Temporary though it may have been, this
unaccustomed inferiority left Britain’s statesmen apprehensive about her future. For unlike
the American theater of the Revolution, the Anglo-Bourbon conflict was essentially a
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maritime struggle.53
Lord Sandwich grasped the implications of Spanish intervention perfectly. “England
till this time,” he observed, “was never engaged in a sea war with the House of Bourbon
thoroughly united, their Naval force unbroken, and having no other war or object to draw off
their attention & resources.”54 Like others in Britain, however, Sandwich gave too much
weight to outward appearances where Spain was concerned. It was true that the Spanish
navy’s major ports—Cadiz, Ferrol, and Cartagena—possessed excellent dockyards, and that
a surge of naval construction had begun in the mid-1770s which would augment the fleet’s
size even further after war broke out. Individual Spanish warships, too, were universally
respected for their quality.55
But behind its impressive facilities and vast number of ships, Spain’s navy hid some
crippling weaknesses.

Many of its officers were hopelessly inept, having received

commissions only through hurried, arbitrary wartime promotions. Their incompetence moved
one French commodore inspecting maneuvers to say in disgust, “Their ships all sail so badly
that they can neither overtake an enemy nor escape from one.”56 A similar unevenness
characterized the ships’ crews; their pay was abysmal, and their discipline and level of training
often reflected it. With regard to the ships themselves, Britain had partly offset the effect of
Spain’s entry into the war by coppering the hulls of many vessels for improved speed. Few
Spanish ships had coppered bottoms before 1783.57
The trouble did not end there. At the strategic level, too, the sound appearance of
Spain's naval force distribution58 masked its leadership’s underlying indifference to politicomilitary priorities at sea. Spain’s prospective war prizes would all depend on seapower for
their retention after conquest, so naval grand strategy should logically have been the object
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of much debate. But it was ignored. Instead, a meek and indecisive officer corps reduced the
navy to a “peninsula-hugging fleet” by hoarding warships in home waters near Ferrol and
Cadiz, and shunning action except when attacked. The naval high command could not even
honor its commitment to maintain sixteen to eighteen ships of the line off Gibraltar, a top
priority.59
In both its lack of elan and its perceived mission, then, the Spanish navy obeyed the
feeble counsel of one of Charles IH’s advisers: “It is neither advisable nor necessary that our
fleet should attack that of the British...the King should preserve his fleet so as to cover the
seas and guard the coasts, protect trade to the Indies, and carry out, when the British have
left, some of those other projects he proposes to undertake.”60
Foreign opinion of Spain’s navy varied, depending on the commentator’s familiarity
with it. Americans had no recent experience of Spanish seapower, but they understood the
arithmetic of naval superiority and wanted Spain’s fleet on their side. George Washington,
who sensed early in the war that “the truth of the position will intirely depend on naval
events,” believed that Spanish aid could neutralize Britain’s naval preponderance over France
in American waters.61
But Spain’s European neighbors knew better. The French initially hoped for naval
cooperation from their new allies, but the impotence of the armada in 1779, followed by a
Spanish admiral’s flat refusal to join French ships in attacking British islands in the West
Indies the next year, would quickly set them straight as to Spain’s intentions. In any case it
proved impossible to coordinate fleet movements when the allies started every campaign from
separate ports (the French from Brest, the Spaniards from Cadiz). Vergennes came to view
the Spanish fleet merely as a device to be preserved for maintaining pressure on Britain; and
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Montmorin, his subordinate in Madrid, was “not at all anxious that it should meet with the
British. ..a defeat would have the most disastrous consequences.”62 This from Spain’s ally.
As for her enemy, “the English,” as John Adams noted in 1780, “do not seem to take
Spain into their account at all. They make their calculations to equal or excel the French a
little, but reckon the Spaniards for nothing.” The sorry performance of the Spanish navy in
the war cheered Parliament, which had feared in 1779 that “Spain held the balance in her
hand....[and] would give a decisive superiority against England” by virtue of her powerful
fleet. By war’s end, it would become clear that that fleet “might indeed be numerous, but
many of their ships were foul.”63
The acid test of war stripped away the veneer of Spanish naval power. Spain’s fleet
would win no victories at sea, or even capture a British ship of the line, through four years
of combat.64 The fleet seldom came into battle, and when it did, its posture was invariably
defensive despite a frequent superiority in numbers to the British. By avoiding decisive
engagements even though its nation was on the strategic offensive, the Spanish navy amply
justified later historians who asserted that it was of little consequence in the American
Revolution. For its presence it mattered; by its actions it would achieve nothing.65
sH * *
The great Bourbon invasion o f 1779 was a disaster from the start. D ’Orvilliers and
the French fleet sailed from Brest on June 3 to rendezvous with the Spaniards near Corunna.
On July 2, eight Spanish ships of the line from Ferrol joined them off Cape Finisterre, but the
bulk of Spain’s fleet, under 73-year-old Admiral Don Luis de Cordoba, had not left Cadiz
until June 23 and so did not arrive until a month later. With Cordoba’s appearance the
Bourbon force now numbered sixty-six ships of the line, and thirty-six of them were Spanish.
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Thirteen frigates rounded out the combined fleet.66
Late to begin with, the admirals subsequently squandered another week of summer
weather and valuable provisions coordinating their signals, before finally heading for the
English Channel on July 30. The French were now seven weeks at sea with nothing to show
for it.67 On land it was the same story o f waste, as thousands of French troops under the
Comte de Rochambeau idled in staging areas between Le Havre and St. Malo, waiting for the
Bourbon warships to vanquish Britain’s Home Fleet so their transports could ferry them
across to Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight. Week after week they practiced landings in the
summer heat.68
That weather, in conjunction with smallpox, dysentery, and lack of supplies, had taken
a fearful toll on the sailors. By August 16, when the Bourbon armada finally came in sight
of Plymouth, over half of them were ill or dying. So many French corpses were tossed
overboard that the people of Plymouth, fearing contamination, were afraid to eat fish for
weeks afterward.69
Englishmen greeted the news of the combined fleet in ‘their’ Channel with a mixture
of trepidation and bravado. George HI immediately put the best face on the invasion, saying,
“I sigh for an action. I know it must turn out to the advantage of this nation.” His optimism
was admirable considering that Sir Charles Hardy, commanding the British Home Fleet, could
muster only thirty-nine warships to oppose the Bourbon navies. Some in that overmatched
British fleet hoped, with their countrymen, that the armada was only “a bugbear, and a cloak
for other more important operations.”70 But to many the appearance of over seventy enemy
sails presaged disaster. Panic spread through Britain’s Channel ports, the press bemoaned the
scarcity of regulars available to meet the threat, and militia flocked to temporary camps in
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Winchester, Salisbury, and other towns.71 There they waited, tensely, for the attack that
never came.
In the end, squabbling within the Bourbon high command prevented the armada from
meeting a single one of its goals. Cordoba felt slighted at the idea of taking orders from a
Frenchman, even though d’Orvilliers had been named the armada’s commander-in-chief by
prior arrangement. The French admiral, for his part, revealed a timidity undesirable in the
leader of any offensive expedition. On top of his complaints about sickness (too much) and
provisions (too few), he once actually asserted that the combined fleet was too large to
maneuver effectively in the English Channel. Paris added to the confusion by attempting to
divert the fleet toward Cornwall midway through its cruise.72
Amid such petty bickering and general incompetence, it is no surprise that the
Bourbons never established a beachhead in Britain or sank any enemy warships. They
captured only one British vessel, the 64-gun Ardent, and that by accident.73 Late in August,
on Hardy’s initiative, the opposing fleets made contact for the only time that summer. But
d’Orvilliers responded lethargically, allowing the smaller British squadron to flee up the
Channel to safety. The armada resumed its aimless cruising for a few weeks more, and on
September 13 it returned to Brest.74
By then the invasion scare in Britain had passed. The North ministry believed that the
danger was over, for that year at least. “We have no reason to be dissatisfied,” the prime
minister wrote Sandwich, “at the event of their retiring without any advantage... after their
great preparations, their immense expenses, their boastings, their menaces, and their having
in fact an opportunity of attacking us... which I flatter myself they will hardly ever have again.”
All of Britain shared Lord North’s relief, and that autumn the musical comedy “Plymouth in
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an Uproar” played to huge crowds in London.75
Across the Channel, d’Orvilliers retired from the French navy upon his return to Brest.
A joint military-naval council decided on October 3 to abandon all further attempts at refitting
the armada for that year. With that, Cordoba returned to Cadiz with sixteen warships, leaving
the others in Brest for the winter.76 Floridablanca’s grand vision had not met with any
tangible defeat, but had instead melted away to nothingness.
Looking back, Britain’s opponents took an understandably dim view of the whole
campaign. American colonists knew little about the armada—and cared less—even though
by its presence it had prevented British reinforcements from reaching General Clinton’s army
in New York.77 But to Versailles and Madrid, the expedition’s futility boded ill for future
combined operations between France and Spain. On top of that, there was the sheer
wastefulness of it all. Queen Marie Antoinette of France, herself no stranger to extravagance,
summed up the frustration of both courts when she lamented, “It will have cost a deal of
money to do nothing.”78 For Spain as well as France in 1779, money was already in short
supply.

“A PENNYLESS POCKET”:
The Spanish War Economy, 1775-1783

The Spaniards... tho’ they talked so loud are now averse to War. My
Conjecture is that Spain wishes to play a saving Game till her Galleons arrive.
Lord Stormont to Lord Weymouth,
February 26, 17781

In October 1778, with Spanish-American alliance still a distant hope, George
Washington wrote wistfully, “If the Spaniards would but join their Fleets to those of France,
and commence hostilities, my doubts would all subside. Without it, I fear the British Navy
has it too much in its power to counteract the Schemes of France.”2 Much as Washington
valued Spain’s seapower, he realized that “she is withheld from interfering by some weighty
political motives; and how long these may continue to restrain her, is a question I am
unqualified to determine.”3
Spain’s motives were weighty indeed, but to restrict them to the merely “political” is
to underrate the influence of her economic and military (especially maritime) preparedness on
when, where, and how she decided to commit herself in the American war. Finance and
commerce seldom lead the list of geopolitical forces, but for Spain they powerfully influenced
the extent—and the limitations—of her involvement in the war. They also determined where
the chief thrust of Spanish military power would be directed. For both reasons, economic
issues merit independent consideration as forces shaping Spain’s global policy during these
years.
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That Spain entered the American Revolution at all owed much to the threat Britain
posed to her economic interests in the New World. Jealously guarding her riches from the
clutches of British imperialism, Spain had geopolitical ambitions which—in the Americas at
least—were distinctly economic in nature. She wished to evict British loggers from the
valuable Honduran coast, and she coveted the Floridas for their usefulness in reestablishing
the Gulf of Mexico as a Spanish lake and zone of economic monopoly.

Even the

Newfoundland fisheries, far to the north of any Spanish political interests, attracted Madrid’s
attention as a potential zone o f shared monopoly with France, in the event the Bourbon
powers managed to conquer the island.4
Even at the outset, Spain’s behavior in the war was dictated by economic necessity.
The Convention of Aranjuez had been signed in April 1779, yet Madrid delayed issuing a
formal declaration of war until June 16, when the annual plate fleet laden with South
American treasure began to dock in Spanish ports. The safe arrival of these ships was one
factor in Spain’s advocacy of an invasion of England. Such an attack, many argued, would
bottle up Britain’s Home Fleet in the Channel and permit the Spanish flota to cross the
Atlantic unmolested. (This was precisely what happened in 1779.)5 So much of Spain’s
wealth throughout the 1770s had come across on these ships that the interruption of their
passage for more than a year would presage a national economic catastrophe. Lord North
knew that “Nothing can more enfeeble the operations of the Spaniards in war, than an
impediment to their gold trade,” and with Britain’s supremacy on the high seas, the latter was
in the optimum position to effect a blockade. If and when she did, Spain would have to
devise stopgap measures that could bring far-reaching—and adverse—consequences in their
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train.
The outbreak of the American war in 1775 had found Spain in the midst of an
economic renaissance. Under Charles III the economy, like much else in Spain, had been so
revitalized that the half century after 1750 has been called the age of “greatest material
progress in the annals of Spain.”6 Treasure poured in from the mines of Peru, while Mexican
and Spanish mints turned out so much bullion that Spanish coin was unchallenged as the
medium of choice in international currency transactions. The riches of Spain’s American
empire were so legendary that in September 1779 both Britain’s colonial secretary, Lord
George Germain, and her army’s chief o f staff, General Jeffery Amherst, briefly harbored
visions of the American rebels reuniting with the mother country to join her in plundering the
Spanish colonies. Viewed in Spanish terms, the 1770s were boom years for the national
economy.7
But relative to the rest of Europe, Spain was ill-prepared to finance an all-out war.
Much o f the wealth drawn annually from the Americas and Philippines found its way into
private hands, hence the government had little surplus to deal with any crises that might
threaten national security. Spain had been fortunate in receiving an exceptionally large import
of treasure just before she entered the American war. Still, the British journalist who in 1780
called the Spanish treasury “a pennyless pocket” was not far wrong. Rapidly its specie
reserves ran dry, and neither voluntary popular contributions nor substantial Dutch loans
could obviate the need for more drastic financial measures on the part of the government.8
Madrid’s response in the summer of 1780 was to issue paper money ("vales reales) for
the first time in Spanish history. Before examining the effects of this controversial decision
on Spain’s war effort, we must first trace the forces that drove Charles Ill’s government to
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take such an unprecedented step.
A major and ongoing source of expense was outright Spanish assistance to the
Americans. Long before Spain embarked on full-scale military intervention, the granting of
subsidies to the rebellious colonists was Bourbon policy in both Paris and Madrid. Eager to
weaken Britain but fearful lest the contagion of revolt spread southward to Spanish America,
Spanish ministers had ample incentive to keep the British at war with their colonies, helping
each side to bleed the other white while upholding the monarchic principle. “Surely it suits
us,” wrote Spanish foreign minister Jeronimo Grimaldi to Vergennes in March 1776, “that the
revolt of these people be kept up and we ought to desire that they and the English exhaust
themselves reciprocally.” To this end, Spain began funding America’s war effort in 1776, and
continued even after such contributions had become a serious burden on her own hardpressed economy.

George III of Britain protested Spain’s aid to the Americans, but

expressed relief that her policy was not militarily menacing. “She promises pecuniary
Assistance but fairly declines War,” he observed in 1777, adding the dubious praise that Spain
at least “acts more honorably than France...towards the Rebels.”9 Doubtless he knew that
honor had nothing to do with it.
When the French playwright Pierre Caron de Beaumarchais conceived a plan in 1776
for aiding the Americans through the ‘front’ of the fictitious Roderigue Hortalez and
Company, Spain matched France’s initial contribution of one million livres ($181,500),
channeled through American envoy Arthur Lee. Louisiana governors Unzaga and Galvez
supplied money and munitions to merchant Oliver Pollock and other American agents
operating in New Orleans. And John Jay, whatever his diplomatic failures in Madrid, did
convince Foreign Minister Floridablanca to underwrite numerous bills which Congress had
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forwarded to Jay for payment.10 American leaders thought such aid the least Spain could
contribute to humble a traditional enemy, short of fighting him openly, but Spaniards claimed
that the resources simply were not available much of the time. Jay’s experience persuaded
him that indeed, “There is little Com in Egypt,” but Alexander Hamilton, a man who knew
something about money, was unimpressed. “If they were heartily disposed to do it, they
might still afford us some assistance,” he wrote. “Their conduct hitherto has manifested no
such disposition; it has been as cold and reserved as it could well be.”11
But Spain was grappling with a monetary problem of her own: retrieving the products
of her Mexican and Peruvian mines while the British navy straddled the transatlantic sea lanes.
Floridablanca likened his country’s predicament to that of the legendary Tantalus, “who with
Water in View could not make use of it.”12 The comparison was painfully accurate, for the
British menace often forced Spanish captains to tie up treasure-laden galleons in Caribbean
ports for safety, cutting off the flow of specie from the New World. Not only did this restrict
the quantity of precious metals in circulation, but the interruption of Spain’s sea-borne trade
also diminished the customs revenues on which the Spanish treasury depended for steady
income.13 These reduced revenues had to finance expensive campaigns in West Florida and
the Caribbean; the outfitting of fleets to Algiers, Buenos Aires, England, Minorca, and
Gibraltar; and the suppression of rebellions in Peru and New Granada.14 Because Spain’s war
effort from 1779 to 1783 was predominantly naval (a money-intensive way to fight), the sheer
physical separation of her interests from one another and her perceived need to attend to them
all would have rendered this war costly for Spain even had she refused financial support to
the American rebels.
In spite of its difficulties, Charles’s government did grant the Americans a total of
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$214,098 in loans and $397,230 in subsidies. Though this amount paled in comparison to
France’s contributions-"^, 171,000 and $1,996,500 respectively—it represented a severe
drain on the Spanish treasury all the same. Recent historians downplay the Spanish subsidies
to America as having “little actual result,” or being “hardly influential”; but in a geopolitical
sense this aid was actually critical to the outcome of the war. For much of it was used in the
American West, where the colonists’ military victories gave them a basis for treaty claims
which they upheld in 1783 at Spain’s expense.15
In addition to having territorial aims in two hemispheres, the expense of particular
conquests immensely complicated Madrid’s economic calculations. Its paramount military
objective was Gibraltar, and Spanish forces repeatedly poured blood and treasure into fruitless
attacks on the Rock from land and sea. To finance the climactic “great assault” of 1782, the
government took out loans in Europe at 18 to 20 percent interest. Such a rate was then
usurious even for wartime, but Spain had no alternative but to pay it. As will be seen, when
Madrid had attempted to recoup the loss from earlier campaigns by increasing taxes on her
subjects in the Americas (it was politically impossible to do so at home), the creole
“Comuneros” of New Granada had risen up in protest.16 Thereafter, the government
borrowed the funds it needed to wage war instead o f extracting them from Spain’s
dependencies.
Yet another significant expenditure was the purchase of alliances in which the other
party had no interest in Spain’s fortunes. Such was the case with Morocco, whose pirates had
long preyed on Spanish shipping. Early in 1781, as the Spanish noose tightened on Gibraltar,
Floridablanca arranged to lease the African ports of Tangier and Tetuan from Sultan
Mohammed I for £7,500,000. Besides buying Spain a temporary ally in the vital western
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Mediterranean, this transaction deprived Britain of her only local supplier of provisions and
munitions for Gibraltar’s defense.17 Later, though, as one British admiral after another burst
through Spanish siege lines to revictual the Rock’s garrison, the money spent for the
Moroccan ports proved merely another tragic waste of Spain’s limited resources.
The Spanish navy managed to offset some of these losses by seizing British merchant
vessels. Its most spectacular capture took place off the Azores on August 9, 1780, when a
squadron under Cordoba intercepted the annual British trading fleet bound for the East and
West Indies. Driving sixty-one ships of the British convoy into Cadiz harbor, the Spaniards
took 2,865 prisoners and £1,500,000 worth of military and naval supplies.18 Captures such
as this were stunning moral victories for Spain, but they could never make up for the loss of
treasure she suffered from 1779 onward.
Early in the American war, Spanish entrepreneurs in Bilbao turned to privateering to
recover lost profits. As this practice spread among Spaniards and others, the question of
neutrality assumed increasing importance. Privateers often needed neutral ports to redeem
their prizes after capture and, conversely, by flying the flag of a neutral they could avoid being
preyed upon themselves. For the Iberian nations, neutrality became a potent economic as well
as political issue from the outset. Although Spain and Portugal were both technically neutrals
at the start of the contest, they interpreted that status quite differently. Charles III explicitly
proclaimed Spanish neutrality on August 6, 1776, yet the next month Spain secretly opened
both her peninsular and Caribbean bases to American ships. Because Spanish vessels also
began carrying provisions to Havana and other Caribbean ports for sale to the Americans the
following March, they upset Britain’s force dispositions by making her deploy additional fleet
strength off the American coast to prevent such smuggling.19
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On July 4, 1776 in Lisbon, on the other hand, Pombal had persuaded King Joseph I
to bar all American ships, “however distressed,” from Portuguese harbors worldwide. Such
vessels, the royal edict read, were henceforth to be treated as pirates. When Maria I
succeeded her father in 1777, she upheld this decree but declared Portugal strictly neutral in
the American conflict. Ultimately, Portuguese neutrality proved an economic boon to Spain
for two reasons. Besides relieving Madrid of the need to finance an additional army along
their common frontier, it also enabled Spaniards to use Portugal’s flag, ports, and roads to
transport treasure home from the Indies (on those few ships that ran the blockade, anyway)
when Spanish ports were threatened by British naval squadrons.20
*

*

*

As recently as 1775 the Conde de Campomanes, a government minister and renowned
economist, had boasted of Spain’s freedom from paper-money inflation as a great national
asset. But after 1779 Spanish funds steadily dwindled, confronting Charles’s government
with an unpleasant new choice: raise taxes or finance the war effort by inflation.
Increased taxation was anathema to Floridablanca’s reforming ministry, and the
government also feared its effects on Spanish morale. So in 1780, when bond sales to the
public failed to generate the necessary revenue and France turned down Spain’s request for
a sizable loan, Floridablanca chose to accept the offer of a multinational merchants’ syndicate
to endorse the forced circulation o f 9,900,000 pesos’ worth of paper currency. These vales
reales initially carried 4 percent interest and were declared legal tender for all domestic
transactions in place of specie. Early the next year a second issue, of 5,303,100 pesos, was
authorized.21
During this phase of the war, Spanish arms were achieving many of the government’s
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military and territorial objectives, but from an economic standpoint these successes were
scored in the wrong theater. They clustered mostly in North America, where Spain desired
land only as a buffer for her truly valuable properties farther south. In those more important
regions, 1780 and 1781 were marked by setbacks at San Fernando de Omoa and Fort San
Juan on the Spanish Main, and by the costly insurrections of Tupac Amaru in Peru and the
New Granada Comuneros. As all these areas were traditional sources of wealth for Spain,
even their temporary loss, compounded by British seizures of merchant shipping, left Spanish
money reserves in a precarious state.
In the wake of these calamities in the New World, Madrid decided on a third and final
issue o f paper currency. This issue of June 20, 1782 doubled the amount of paper in
circulation. The government made it palatable to the merchant class by using the prestige of
the new Banco de San Carlos to stimulate confidence. This institution, the first national bank
in Spanish history, had been chartered not three weeks earlier by Francis Cabarrus. Its
potential usefulness in promoting paper-money circulation was one motive for its founding,
and it quickly secured the widespread acceptance that this large third issue needed. Never
theless, within three months the paper currency had to be discounted by 13 to 14 percent.22
The inflation caused by the forced circulation of these three fiduciary issues was
noticeable but not disastrous for Spain’s economy. From 1781 to war’s end in 1783, the new
paper money depreciated steadily at about 15 percent. In the process, it sustained price levels
in Spain in the near-absence of fresh specie imports. Of course, the coming of peace in 1783
brought a resumption of American treasure fleet operations, and prices skyrocketed
throughout the country. When working-class wages, which had fallen sharply in 1781, did
not keep pace after the war, the social consequences of paper-money inflation became
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frighteningly apparent to its advocates in Madrid.23 In their resentment at being forced to bear
the burden of war finance, Spain’s American subjects thus found unexpected allies among
peninsular Spaniards of the laboring class.
The era of the American Revolution saw important transitions in Spanish commercial
policies as well. Charles Hi’s program of national economic development had been given an
impetus when France abandoned Spain in the 1770 Falklands crisis, a ‘betrayal’ which hurt
French commercial interests in the Spanish market. English merchants in Spain had long held
an advantage there anyway, one that they quickly recovered when the war ended in 1783.
The Family Compact, it seems, did not extend to economic privileges: in some cases Spain
levied heavier duties on French imports than on goods from Britain. Spaniards had little fear
o f French economic retaliation because in 1769 King Charles had prohibited (for strictly
domestic reasons) all exports of grain, the most important Spanish market product. This ban
was in effect throughout the 1775-1783 period, one more drag on the Spanish economy.24
Whether or not one credits skillful English salesmanship with overcoming the Spanish
consumer’s traditional anglophobia, the fact remains that political and economic interests
clearly did not coincide in Spain’s case; at any rate, not in Europe.
As a nation, Spain was known throughout Europe as “the chief upholder of the old
system of commercial monopoly,” and on this point she never compromised. But within the
Spanish empire, ideas were different.

On October 12, 1778, Madrid announced the

implementation of comercio libre. a ‘free trade’ regime which liberalized earlier trade
restrictions between Spanish port cities and Spain’s American colonies. Previously, certain
ports had enjoyed monopolies of trade with specified American regions—one of them, Cadiz,
retained her trade monopoly of Mexico under the new law—but now all parts of Spain could
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trade with most of Spanish America. For the latter, the new commercial system was only
nominally ‘free,’ since all shipments between Spanish colonies and rest of Europe still had to
pass through Spanish ports. But whatever its shortcomings, the plan worked. Exports to
Spanish America leaped 500 percent, imports from the colonies 900 percent. This expansion
was vital to a nation facing the economic dislocations that Spain would over the next five
years.25
Whether this imperial policy was formulated in anticipation of an imminent war with
Britain is unclear. What is certain is that the growth it fostered helped Spain to bear the cost
of fighting, and that it demonstrated the value of Charles Ill’s American domains at a time
when Madrid was assessing its strategic priorities anew. The proven profitability of the New
World territories was one reason the Spanish peace negotiators in 1782-1783 would be leery
when Britain offered to cede Gibraltar in exchange for Puerto Rico and the Floridas.
Similarly, a combination of profit motive and geopolitics would animate Spain’s plans to
conquer British-held Jamaica in 1782.
Spain’s New World territories benefited in one unforeseen way from the American
Revolution and the British blockade it occasioned. Unable to trade freely with the mother
country, Spanish-American merchants used their de facto alliance with the United States to
increase trade links with North America. One Spanish colony did so on a huge scale. Since
Havana was the center of Spanish naval operations in the west, Cuba had a continuing military
connection to the Floridas which shifted the focus o f her commerce to the north. With
productivity generally high during the war, Cuba used her relative immunity to British attack
to expand her economy and to replace Spain with the United States as her largest trading
partner.26 Few economic effects of the American Revolution lasted until 1959 as this one did,
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but Cuba’s case is only an extreme example o f how this war altered Spain’s global economy.
sk

*

*

The upshot of this economic analysis is that Spain’s financial straits virtually forced
her into a grand strategy based on cheap campaigns for large payoffs. Just as the protection
of her American treasure fleet was an overriding priority before Spain entered the war, the
need to secure her geopolitical/territorial objectives before her domestic economy collapsed
dictated much of Spain’s wartime strategy once the struggle was underway. Floridablanca’s
advocacy of an invasion of England in 1779 was only the first—albeit the best—example of
this practice.
In the long run, most emergency measures that the American Revolution forced on
the Spanish economy—trade liberalization, diversification of markets, and a national bank—
proved beneficial to the country. The introduction of paper currency was a mixed blessing,
but at the same time an absolutely necessary step for a regime “more willing to fight than to
tax.”27 The war stimulated Spain’s imperial and domestic economies alike, an effect rarely
noted by those who rate its outcome solely in terms of territorial gains and losses.
This is not to imply, however, that Spain’s government welcomed the economic
tribulations of war any more than her people did. No nation seeks such a trial. In 1782, the
French foreign minister Vergennes had France’s economic distress in mind when he confided
to a subordinate, “It is necessary to finish [the war] and the sooner the better when we can
do it with dignity and justice.”28 For Spain, suffering even greater financial and commercial
strains, dignity and justice were not all that she hoped to gain. Strategically placed territory
was equally important. The Spaniards had entered the war not for wealth or prestige, but for
geopolitical advantage, and they planned to fight on until they felt they had obtained it.

JACKAL WARFARE:
Spanish Military Operations, 1779-1781

They must know that what we do not get by negotiation
we know how to get with a club.
Floridablanca to Almodovar,
August 25, 17781

Spain’s wartime strategy of picking at the fringes of Britain’s military strength was
not preordained, even by Madrid’s economic constraints. Instead, it evolved in piecemeal
fashion as Spanish geopolitical objectives swung into sharper focus.
The allied armada’s failure to achieve any of its objectives—including the
establishment of maritime cooperation between France and Spain—led Spain to go her own
way thereafter. Once in a great while she required French aid to accomplish her ends,
specifically those in Europe. But of Spain’s four military projects of 1779, only Gibraltar was
a European objective.2 The others— St. George’s Cay, Omoa, and the Mississippi River
forts—were all New World targets. Charles HI anticipated their conquest in a directive issued
on August 29, 1779: “The king has determined that the principal object of his arms in
America during the present war will be to drive them [the English] from the Mexican Gulf and
the neighborhood of Louisiana.”3
The royal proclamation had not yet been delivered when the governor of Spanish
Louisiana set out after the British. Governor Bernardo de Galvez, only thirty-three years of
age in 1779, was the nephew of Spain’s minister of the Indies and a commander of remarkable
56
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energy.4 His aggressiveness appeared even more pronounced in comparison with his British
opposite number in West Florida, the sluggish Major General John Campbell.
Galvez had been ordered in May 1779 to prepare for war, and through a sophisticated
intelligence network along the Mississippi, he learned of British plans to seize New Orleans
once hostilities began. Spanish spies in Mobile, Pensacola, and St. Augustine also reported
back to him on the condition of British defenses there.5 When official notice of Spain’s war
declaration reached him on August 9, he gathered together an army capable of carrying the
fight to the British. Then on August 20, Galvez assembled the people of New Orleans in the
town square, announced his promotion from acting to permanent governor of Louisiana, and
asked their support for Spain’s new war against Britain. Then, “by beat of drum,” he
recognized “the Independency of America.” Needless to say, Galvez’s showmanship won
over the enthusiastic crowd. “Viva al Rey!” they cheered. (It mattered little to any of them
that Charles III would withhold diplomatic recognition from the United States until August
23, 1783, over four years later.)6
General Campbell in Pensacola did not learn that hostilities had commenced until
September 9. In August a French fleet under Admiral the Comte d’Estaing with some 20,000
troops had arrived at St. Domingue (now Haiti) and so frightened British Vice-Admiral Sir
Peter Parker in nearby Jamaica that he detained the British messenger there for weeks. This
delay enabled Galvez’s attack on Britain’s Mississippi forts to achieve complete surprise.7
The Spanish force o f667 men departed New Orleans on August 27. Additional militia
and friendly Indians joined Galvez as his troops marched upriver, raising his total strength to
1,427 when he reached the enemy’s Fort Bute at Manchac on September 6. Unlike Britain’s
other Mississippi River settlements whose primary function was agriculture, Manchac was
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essentially a strategic post. Its location 121 miles from New Orleans stood testimony to an
earlier British attempt to cut a canal eastward from the Mississippi to the Iberville River,
which would allow British river traffic to bypass Spanish-held New Orleans.8 That effort
having failed, Fort Bute was now a decaying sentry post at which Colonel Alexander Dickson,
British commander on the Mississippi, had left a garrison of just twenty-three soldiers. Like
General Campbell, who ignored his predecessor’s advice to concentrate West Florida’s
limited manpower around Pensacola and Mobile, Dickson elected to sprinkle his 457 regulars
and their officers randomly among the Mississippi strong points of Manchac, Baton Rouge,
and Natchez.
Galvez swiftly taught Dickson the foHy of that decision. He carried Fort Bute without
loss in a morning attack on September 7; then, after a six-day rest to refit, the Spaniards
moved on Baton Rouge, fifteen miles farther north.9
Fort New Richmond at Baton Rouge was Britain’s strongest outpost on the
Mississippi. Built on the plantation of two British loyalists in the six weeks before Galvez
appeared, it occupied a high bluff commanding the river in both directions. The Spaniards,
strengthened by reinforcements to nearly 2,600 men, laid siege to the redoubt and
maneuvered their artillery into position.10 When they unleashed a three-hour cannonade that
breached the walls, killing four defenders and wounding ten, Dickson surrendered Fort New
Richmond and 405 prisoners to Galvez on September 21.11 “The flower of the Army in West
Florida” had been lost, but Campbell in Pensacola still knew nothing of Galvez’s actions.12
The Spanish governor had driven a hard bargain, compelling Dickson to surrender his
post at Natchez (whose high bluffs formed a position of great natural strength) as part of the
Baton Rouge capitulation. Galvez then dispatched Captain Juan de Villebeuvre to Natchez
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with fifty men to occupy stoutly-built Fort Panmure and imprison its garrison. They did so
peacefully on October 5, leaving the town’s loyalists speechless with fury over Dickson’s
selling them, in every sense, down the river.13
Galvez’s total casualties in this campaign were one man killed and two wounded. In
return his army had taken three British forts, eight ships, and 484 prisoners, all in barely a
month’s time.14 It was Spain’s greatest bargain of the war.
The key to Galvez’s success was Spain’s prior ownership of strategically-placed New
Orleans. “As to the Territories on the Mississippi,” General Campbell observed after the fact,
“it appears to me, that they must necessarily belong to the Sovereign who has possession [of]
Orleans.”15 Galvez’s lightning campaign made the Spaniards “masters of the part of West
Florida of the most real intrinsic value” at negligible cost. It also opened a second front that
drew British military might away from the embattled American colonists.

Finally, by

employing offensive tactics for strategic defense, Galvez had eliminated the threat of any
British strike down the Mississippi toward New Orleans.16 That city’s security protected
valuable New Spain to the south.
The Regiment of Spain, 640 additional men from Havana, joined Galvez in midOctober, but he deemed it too late in the season for further campaigning.17 After leaving
garrisons at his newly-acquired outposts, he returned to New Orleans to plan his next move.
The focus of Spain’s war drifted southward.
* * *
Galvez’s thrust up the Mississippi was not yet complete when the Spaniards struck
another blow in Central America. Just as Galvez had opened a second front for the British
on the Gulf Coast, the Spanish expedition to St. George’s Cay created a third on the Spanish
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Main. A tiny islet off the coast of Belize, St. George’s had been the seat of Britain’s
Honduran logging trade since 1763, a constant thorn in the side of Spanish imperialists.
A Spanish surprise attack by sea on September 15, 1779 captured St. George’s,
seizing treasure, slaves, and about 100 British prisoners, but soon it became apparent that the
post was indefensible by either side. Several days later, the British frigate Pomona appeared
almost by accident and sent the Spaniards fleeing.18
But the Pomona’s arrival was not entirely fortuitous. Her presence so near the
Spanish Main reflected London’s newly-declared policy of actively harassing and, where
possible, seizing Spanish possessions throughout the world. It had long been an article of
faith in British military circles that
Spain is precisely that country against which [England] can at all times
contend, with the fairest prospect of advantage and honor. That extensive
monarchy, though vigorous at the extremities, is exhausted at the heart...and
whatever power commands the ocean, may command the wealth and
commerce of Spain....The dominions of Spain from which she draws her
principal resources [lie] at an immense distance from the capital and one
another.19
And Lord George Germain was grimly determined to avoid a “tame defensive war” which he
felt would ruin Britain. George HI had once insinuated that Germain “lets his imagination run
too far... and then reasons upon very slight foundation.”20 As if to prove his sovereign right,
ever since learning of Spain’s war declaration in June 1779 the colonial secretary had been
firing off instructions to his generals across the Atlantic. That very month Germain had
concocted a plan to arm the Mosquito Indians of Central America and “encourage them to
make Inroads into the Spanish Settlements in the Neighbourhood” of Darien on the
Panamanian isthmus. In doing so, he hoped, Britain could foster the establishment of an
Indian or creole state there, one “independent of the Spanish Government” and open to
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settlement by “Freebooters of all Nations.” The chaos that Charles III was abetting within
the British empire would thus be visited upon his own colonies to the south.21
To indicate where he thought some of these hypothetical freebooters might be found,
Germain ordered Clinton in New York to publicize the Darien plan in hopes of enticing
American “adventurers” to join the proposed expedition. He was only one of many in the
British government in 1779 who imagined that their rebellious subjects—even some in
Washington’s army—would “return to their Allegiance and flock to the Royal Standard” if
the temptation of “acquiring Plunder in the Spanish Dominions” were dangled before them.22
Not surprisingly, the quest for riches was what had drawn the Pomona to Central
America. The frigate’s true destination was the Spanish port of Omoa on the Gulf of
Honduras. Dubbed “one of the most unhealthy spots in the universe” by British Captain
William Dalrymple, the town was dominated by Fort San Fernando de Omoa, a triangular
edifice situated thirty feet from the shoreline.23 The jungle loomed in its rear. Because Omoa
was an important stop for convoys bearing dyestuffs and other goods from Guatemala, Spain
had been at “incredible Expence” in erecting the fort. Its construction, reported Dalrymple,
“constantly employed 1000 Men at work for 20 years,” and by 1779 it bristled with the
cannon and muskets of 506 Spanish defenders.24
British Commodore John Luttrell had previously sent a schooner to reconnoiter
Omoa’s defenses and report on the number of Spanish treasure ships, if any, in its harbor.
Learning that three register ships lay at anchor there, he sent a naval patrol to shell Fort San
Fernando. But the fort proved impregnable from the sea, so on October 10 Luttrell landed
Dalrymple and a mixed force of one thousand regulars, marines, Mosquito Indians, and
“Baymen” (loggers from neighboring Belize) in a nearby cove. While Luttrell’s six ships
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continued bombarding the fort from offshore, Dalrymple’s men circled behind it and
materialized out of the jungle. They immediately surrounded the fort and dug in.25
The British had achieved that rarest of military feats: “the greatest harmony,” in
Dalrymple’s words, “between the Sea and Land Forces.” Quickly they moved to exploit their
success. After a three-day siege, Dalrymple’s troops stormed the barricades on the morning
of October 20. Thirty Spaniards died bravely resisting the assault and eleven fell wounded,
but a full hundred “run away” and vanished among the trees. Later that day, Spanish
commanders Desnaux and Dastiex turned over to Dalrymple the fort, its remaining garrison,
and all three register ships with 3,000,000 pesetas’ worth of treasure in their holds.26
Subsequent historians have painted the Battle of Omoa as a “remarkably gallant little
affair” for the chivalrous spirit displayed there. Dalrymple himself wrote a glowing report of
the victory, calling Omoa “the Key to the Bay of Honduras... an important article in a treaty
of peace and in time of War.” Perhaps he realized the port’s geopolitical importance to Spain;
he certainly convinced Germain, who sensed that this minor triumph promised a “fair prospect
of success” for Britain on the Spanish Main. The colonial secretary guessed that once the
Spanish court got word of Omoa’s fall, “there is good reason to suppose the Alarm will be
great, and their Attention drawn to that Quarter”—and presumably away from beleaguered
West Florida.27
In the event, they were both premature. A failure of leadership and the tropical
climate saw to that. Dalrymple had orders to destroy Fort San Fernando to free his troops
for a campaign in Nicaragua, but instead he garrisoned the place and left Honduras. His
garrison rapidly succumbed to assorted jungle diseases. On November 25, at the approach
of a “parti-coloured rabble” of Spaniards led by the captain-general of Guatemala, Matias de
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Galvez (father of Bernardo), the seventy-four British survivors abandoned their conquest
without firing a shot.28
Germain was disgusted with the whole fiasco. “The fort at Omoa should have been
demolished as soon as taken,” he scolded, “since the captors did not think proper to leave a
garrison there sufficient for its defence.” Late in the year, an operation contemplated by the
Admiralty to subdue Spanish Puerto Rico met a similarly inglorious fate when Britain could
not mass sufficient forces to give the project a chance of success.29
So ended the campaigns of 1779, Spain’s first year of active participation in the
American Revolution. Gibraltar lay blockaded, and Galvez had conquered miles of strategic
Mississippi River frontage. But more important, Spain had suffered no net loss in all of her
vast dominions worldwide. Given London’s plans and Madrid’s earlier fears, that in itself was
quite a surprise.
* * *
The new year, however, opened on a disastrous note for Spain. Outwardly it seemed
optimistic enough: her six-month-long naval blockade of Gibraltar was taking its toll on the
garrison, and Britain’s five-ship Mediterranean squadron was powerless to break its grip.
Only a British force of equal size could revictual the Rock, so Lord Sandwich had dispatched
Admiral George B. Rodney late in December 1779 with a convoy and reinforcements.
George III had great hopes for the expedition. “If We arrive in time at Gibraltar Spain will
not Succeed in that attack which will very probably allay the fury of the Spanish Monarch and
make him more willing to end the War.” So Rodney attached Rear-Admiral Robert Digby’s
Channel Fleet to his own and sailed south with twenty-one ships of the line, far more than
Spanish or French ministers believed Britain could devote to the expedition. When Rodney’s
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fleet came upon an eleven-ship Spanish patrol off Cape St. Vincent, 150 miles from Cadiz,
on January 16, 1780, the conclusion was inescapable. Don Juan de Langara, the Spanish
admiral, allowed the British ships to maneuver close before he realized his peril. Coppered
bottoms, Britain’s newest technological innovation, gave Rodney’s vessels an edge in speed,
and Spain’s crewmen were no match for the British either. In a running night battle,
Rodney’s fleet captured four Spanish warships, drove two more onto the rocky coast, and
blew up a seventh bearing eighty guns. The British accomplished the replenishment of
Gibraltar and Minorca without further incident.
Sandwich was ecstatic, pointing out that Rodney “had captured more line of battle
ships than had been taken in any one action in either of the two last preceding wars.” Spanish
morale hit its lowest point of the war. But Britain had not achieved her two-to-one advantage
without cost. For the remainder of Spain’s fleet lay in Cadiz undergoing repairs for the
spring’s upcoming campaigns, Rodney had exhausted the portion of his fleet that would
continue on to America, and his borrowing of the Channel Fleet for six weeks enabled a
French fleet under the Chevalier de Temay to slip out the Channel for America long before
British Admiral Graves could refit and give chase. Whatever its short-term moral effect on
the two combatants, the battle of Cape St. Vincent set the conditions for a year of Bourbon
successes across the Atlantic—a year that would see Spanish grand strategy begin to pay
great dividends geopolitically.30
The allied offensives of 1780 did not begin auspiciously. Spain’s policy of self-interest
without heed of friend or foe was manifest again on February 26, when Aranda requested that
France redirect her new expeditionary force for America from Rhode Island to Georgia.
Implicit in this suggestion was the awareness that a French army (and fleet of transports) in
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the South could best serve Spanish designs on Florida and the Bahamas. Vergennes turned
down Aranda’s request, citing a lack of safe harbors and his concern about a British descent
on nearby Charleston. This fear was soon borne out, as General Sir Henry Clinton besieged
the city that spring with troops shipped south from Newport. South Carolina governor John
Rutledge pleaded with Havana to send a Spanish fleet and army to relieve Charleston, but to
no effect.31 Clinton daily drew the noose tighter until General Benjamin Lincoln’s 5,400-man
garrison surrendered on May 12, 1780. Spanish parsimony in this case was self-defeating in
the extreme. Many of the soldiers in Charleston had gathered there in preparation for an
attack on East Florida to deliver it to Spain, as Congress had promised and Juan de Miralles
had repeatedly prodded the delegates to remember.32
But Spain’s military planners were too taken with their own projects to mourn a lost
opportunity in the Carolinas. Galvez had been given the option of attacking Pensacola or
Mobile on the Gulf Coast of British West Florida. Mobile could stand without Pensacola but
not the other way around, he decided, and accordingly set his sights on Mobile’s dilapidated
Fort Charlotte. Campbell in Pensacola was also uncertain of Galvez’s next target, and fear
for his capital paralyzed him until it was too late.33
With 754 men, Galvez left New Orleans in January 1780 and sailed for Mobile Bay.
After riding out a hurricane and bolstered by a reinforcement of 1,412 men from Havana the
next month, he overran Mobile’s principal outpost and appeared before Fort Charlotte on
March 1. In a demand for surrender, Galvez threatened to make the defenders “suffer all the
extremities of war” if they tried the patience of his troops with a “useless and inopportune
resistance.” But the garrison’s commander, Captain Elias Dumford, retorted that despite
their numerical disadvantage, his men had no intention of giving up without a fight. The
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Spaniards dug in,34
Campbell finally awoke to Mobile’s danger and sent help, but Galvez’s naval control
of Mobile Bay forced the British and Indian relief party to trek overland through malarial
bayous to reach the besieged stockade. This effort—Campbell’s only glimmer of initiative
in the two-year war in West Florida—proved too little, too late, and the rescuers turned back
to Pensacola having accomplished nothing. After a two-week siege climaxed by a Spanish
cannonade, Fort Charlotte fell to Galvez on March 14, 1780. Once again Spain’s losses were
negligible: 8 men killed and 7 wounded to achieve the capture of 284 prisoners, 35 cannon,
and the conquest of the second city in West Florida.35
Campbell complained with some justification that “one single frigate would have
prevented our late disaster.” But against the combined Bourbon fleets in the Gulf, Britain
could not maintain even a local superiority of force at sea—a vital prerequisite for the
protection of her port garrisons. Her chief Caribbean base at Port Royal was nearly twice the
distance from West Florida that Havana was, and Admiral Parker’s hoarding of ships there
to protect Jamaica had further exposed Florida’s coast, not for the last time.36
So uplifting was the effect of Mobile’s fall on Spanish morale that Galvez boasted to
a gathering of Choctaw Indians that he would not leave Britain “a foot of land in West Florida
in a few months.”37 Even in their rhetoric, Spaniards spoke the language of territory.
Their British foes, in contrast, were interested in trade and influence. London had
long toyed with the idea that an expedition to Central America could force its way through
Darien (Panama) or Nicaragua to the Pacific Ocean, thereby securing “a safe and easy
Communication with the Western Coast of America across the Isthmus.”38 So upon learning
of the initial success of the Omoa enterprise, Germain had written the governor of Jamaica,
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John Dalling, that he was sending three thousand reinforcements for “the obtaining possession
of the River St. John, and the Lake Nicaragua, & opening a Communication through them
with the South Sea at Reja Lejia [Realejo].” As a diversion, Germain suggested a feint
against Guatemala.39
The Fort San Juan expedition of 1780 proved far different in actual execution.
Governor Dalling, a glory hunter, chose not to wait for the detachment from Britain to arrive,
but launched his own assault on the Spanish Main in February. Its commander, Major John
Poison, had hoped to enlist the support of friendly Mosquito Indians, but several weeks of
recruiting yielded nothing and wasted valuable ‘dry season’ campaigning time. Poison’s party
then struggled up the treacherous Rio San Juan on the 24-gun frigate Hinchinbrook. captained
by Horatio Nelson. After taking a small outpost by storm, they reached Fort San Juan on
Lake Nicaragua by April. The lethal climate wiped out much of the 500-man force en route,
and more died during the three-week siege that followed.40
Finally, the British opened a six-day bombardment and Fort San Juan’s resistance
crumbled. General Juan de Ayssa surrendered the “Castle” with its 235 defenders to Poison
on April 29,1780, but there the British campaign crested. For immediately afterward began
a “long Continuance of the Rainy and Pestilential Seasons” that decimated Poison’s force.
Reinforcements sent from Jamaica also succumbed to heat and disease; though Britain had
by now landed 1,600 men on the Spanish Main, a fort in the Nicaraguan wilderness was to
be their sole conquest. Far from “helping to divert a part of the force of Spain from the
prosecution of this cruel war” as its planners intended, the expedition was fast becoming a
hole down which British treasure kept flowing with no prospect of victory. Of the promised
force from Britain, which arrived in July, a mere 1,350 survived the scurvy- and fever-ridden
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Atlantic passage in any condition to fight.

In any case, Dalling needed these troops

immediately to defend Jamaica against a new Franco-Spanish threat from St. Domingue. By
late August, the remnants of the San Juan expeditionary force had largely retreated to the
Atlantic coast, hoping to continue after the rains subsided. But Dalling admitted defeat in
November and ordered the survivors back to Jamaica (though Germain, ever the optimist, still
wanted them used against New Orleans). Even evacuation proved costly for Britain,
however, as a body of Spaniards appeared on January 3, 1781 and struck as the British were
destroying the fort. On February 8 the last Englishman finally left the Mosquito Coast bound
for Jamaica, thus ending the war on the Spanish Main.41
Admiral Rodney saw a trend developing at Omoa and San Juan and worried about the
future they implied: “The war in America is now turned to a war of posts, and, unhappily for
England, when they have taken posts of infinite advantage, they have been unaccountably
evacuated without one good reason assigned.”42 Just as in Florida, operations in Central
America consistently took a back seat to the West Indies when resources ran low for either
side. Although British historians have condemned the Fort San Juan campaign as “a badly
organized and badly conducted affair, a dissipation of force, and a waste of valuable lives”
and Germain saw it primarily as a ploy to divert Spanish attention from a British thrust at
New Orleans, in truth the tropical climate threw up an insurmountable barrier to any British
attempt to penetrate Spain’s imperial perimeter south of Louisiana.43 As her success on the
Spanish Main illustrated, not the least of Spain’s accomplishments in the war of 1779-1783
was to throw back every challenge hurled at her empire around the globe. The contrast to
1762 was nowhere more vivid than in the difficult game of imperial defense.
Sparsely populated Louisiana faced but one bona fide British attack during this war,
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but its successful repulse probably saved New Orleans—and consequently West Florida—for
Spain. Once the Mississippi forts fell to Galvez in 1779, British plans to recover control of
the river hinged on an attack from the far north. Spanish-held St. Louis was thus the principal
target of an expedition from Michilimackinac, led by Emanuel Hesse, whose 1,000-man force
of redcoats and Sac and Fox Indians descended on the town on May 26, 1780. But
Lieutenant Governor Fernando de Leyba of Louisiana had posted scouts, so the garrison had
three days’ advance warning of Hesse’s approach. Even so, 68 of the 300 defenders perished
in the assault, which Leyba called one of “unbelievable boldness and fury.” The Indians
inflicted “the most unheard of barbarity” on those unfortunates they caught outside the town’s
walls; they killed and dismembered 21 paisanos. seized prisoners, and butchered livestock
indiscriminately. But once George Rogers Clark’s American force appeared, Hesse’s Indian
allies turned on him and the British fell back to their base in confusion. Leyba died on June
28, and was succeeded by Francisco Cruzat, architect of the 1781 reprisal raid on Fort St.
Joseph that would carry Spanish claims to the shores of Lake Michigan.44
Thus Galvez had secured the lower Mississippi for Spain, Leyba and Cruzat its upper
reaches. Captain Baltazar de Villiers, commandant of Fort Carlos III at the Arkansas Post,
united the two claims on November 22, 1780 by leading a six-man detachment across to the
eastern side of the Mississippi and proclaiming Spain’s formal possession of its banks “as far
as the boundary o f the district of Natchez.”45 Whether Spanish strategists actively
coordinated such operations or, more likely, they arose haphazardly and only incidentally
consolidated Spain’s territorial claims, it is clear that geopolitical awareness characterized
Spanish planning at all levels in the North American west. For after American troops
abandoned their recently-constructed Fort Jefferson in June 1781, Spain could justifiably lay
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claim to all trans- Appalachian lands south of the Ohio River... a fact of no small import to
Spanish diplomats negotiating the final peace settlement.46
Despite the vigor with which Spain parried her numerous thrusts in 1780, Britain
persevered in her plan to disrupt Charles ffl’s empire. That summer, a pair o f Scots named
William Fullarton and Thomas Humbertson had raised two regiments to take part in a
plundering expedition against the Pacific coast of Spanish America. This enterprise was
approved in full by the Cabinet on August 3, with a projected strength of two thousand men
from the home regiments and an equal number of sepoys supplied by the British East India
Company.
However, before the Company could be induced to cooperate, its directors insisted
on a quid pro quo. An operation must first be mounted against the Spanish islands of
Mindanao and Celebes in the Philippines, they argued, since it was doubtful “that any Settle
ment in Peru, Mexico, or Chili, can be held against the forces of Spain,” and a strong British
base somewhere in the Pacific was essential to protect the Company’s commercial interests.
The government had no choice but to acquiesce. On September 30 the secretary of state,
Lord Hillsborough, signed an agreement with the Company’s directors making the Philippines
the primary objective of the project. Preparations went ahead for the troops to sail in
December, but manpower and financial needs elsewhere forced British organizers repeatedly
to postpone their departure.47
The government finally shelved this “South Seas project” for good on December 29,
1780. Again the East India Company had the final word. No longer could the Company
afford to lend its ships and sepoys, the directors said; India itself lay suddenly in danger of
attack from Ceylon and Sumatra. For at last the Dutch had joined the ranks of Britain’s
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enemies.48 That event would mean little enough in the larger scheme of the war, but to the
Spaniards it was a godsend. With easier and richer pickings available to Britain among the
Dutch possessions of the East, the Philippines, this time, had been saved.
* * *
Amid these military successes in 1780, Spain’s imperial fortunes suffered an
unexpected shock as civil revolts rocked South America. This continent, untouched by the
American Revolution except for sporadic British raids on Dutch Guiana, was for Spain a
bottomless and inviolable war chest, but only if she could keep her subjects there in line.
Peru, with its large Indian population and proud Inca heritage, was most ripe for
rebellion under the harsh rule of the corregidores. A young descendant of Inca royalty, Jose
Gabriel Condorcanqui, took the name Tupac Amaru II, rallied the Indians to himself in
November 1780, and vowed to deliver Peru from its ‘enslavement.’ That he also professed
loyalty to Spain’s king and church, and sought primarily to replace the local administration
with one sympathetic to Indian concerns, made no difference to Viceroy Don Agustin
Jauregui, who promptly collected a 15,000-man force to crush him. At the height of the
revolt, Tupac Amaru had 60,000 followers. However, his movement had a strong flavor of
anarchy about it and he himself was a better orator than a soldier. Though he enjoyed some
early successes in the field and dominated the provinces around the ancient Inca capital of
Cuzco for five months, government troops under General Jose del Valle won the climactic
battle of Cuzco on April 6,1781 and virtually extinguished the revolt. Tupac Amaru himself
was captured, mutilated, then drawn and quartered shortly thereafter.49
Spanish dominion over Peru was never seriously jeopardized.50 But the region’s
economic value, especially in wartime, justified Madrid in keeping close watch on the
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progress of Tupac Amaru’s rebellion from the outset. Though unsuccessful, it reminded
Spaniards that potential enemies lay within their empire as well as without.
Even as the flames of racial revolt swept across Peru, a simultaneous uprising “of the
V

most serious nature...occasioned by some late oppressive Taxes on the People” threatened
Spain’s hold on New Granada (now Colombia) in late 1780.51 The so-called “Comuneros del
Socorro,” under provincial leaders Juan Francisco Berbeo and Jose Antonio Galan, were a
broad coalition of six thousand creoles, mestizos, blacks, and Indians, whipped into a frenzy
of opposition against such local government abuses as forced labor, extortion by tax
collectors, ecclesiastical fees, and a ruiiious sales tax called an alcabala. Word of the
revolution in America, traveling “from mouth to mouth among everyone in the uprising,” lent
courage to the Comuneros who marched on the capital.52 Soon after they reached Bogota,
the audiencia there submitted to their demands for tax reform. The mob dispersed almost
immediately.

Characteristically, the government reneged on its pledge, and the army

reasserted its control in August 1781. The ultimate failure of the Comunero movement is less
important than its cause: in addition to her ongoing fiscal reforms, Spain had been compelled
to raise taxes to finance her war with Britain, and tapped every source in her empire to this
end. When corrupt local magistrates exploited the system, as in New Granada, violence
ensued.53 But with a ruthlessness equal to every occasion, the Spanish government
maintained control.

FRIENDSHIP FOR SALE:
Spain’s Wartime Diplomacy, 1779-1782

I do not deceive myself any more than you do, Monsieur, that if Spain treats
separately it is all up with American independence.
Comte de Vergennes to Montmorin,
April 21, 17801

CharlesEH’s war declaration on June 16, 1779 was motivated largely by geopolitical
concerns. Its impact on the American theatre paled in comparison to France’s entry the
previous year. And it required fewer force adjustments by Britain. But observers on both
sides perceived that unlike the last war, Spain had joined this fight in time to make a
difference. While “the event might long have been expected,” George III reflected bitterly
that “had not Spain now thrown off the Mask... we should have soon found the Colonies sue
for pardon.” Richard Henry Lee of Virginia agreed that Spanish intervention had turned King
George’s plans on their head: “Without a miracle now, the Tyrant and his friends must quickly
and humbly sue for peace.”2
Certainly the prospect of having added to their enemies a nation of over nine million
people, with the third-largest navy on earth and more than 112,000 men under arms, must
have given Britons pause. Combined, the Bourbons could draw on a treasury twice the size
of Britain’s own and a population three times as large.3 A Franco-American alliance which
was barely containing British power now possessed, in Henry Laurens’s words, “a decided
superiority adequate to our purposes.” And to Thomas Jefferson, Spain’s participation
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promised the allies “all the certainty of a happy Issue to the present Contest.”4
Few outside Madrid, however, were prepared for the cynical selfishness that Spain
was to demonstrate throughout the American war. At the heart of this behavior lay her
pursuit of empire. It has been shown how Spanish military and naval strategy through 1780
reflected Madrid’s geopolitical conception of the national interest; in the diplomatic arena,
too, the drive to expand and protect her imperial assets dominated Spain’s dealings with other
governments.
* * *
Madrid’s disappointment at the failed invasion of the British Isles in 1779 led to a
curious exchange with its enemy that would have resembled a comic opera, had its potential
consequences not been so grave. Article IH of the Treaty of Aranjuez had bound France and
Spain “not to listen to any direct or indirect proposition on the part of their common enemy,
without communicating it to each other,” but an Irish priest named Thomas Hussey had other
ideas.5
Hussey, a huge man thirty-eight years of age, had been chaplain of the Spanish
embassy in London since 1768. In this capacity he could travel freely between Spain and
Britain, even after Ambassador Almodovar left London following the Spanish declaration of
war. Either at Floridablanca’s urging or on his own initiative, Hussey arranged a meeting in
November 1779 with a secretary to the British Board of Trade and sometime playwright
named Richard Cumberland.6 The subject of their discussion: Britain’s price for Gibraltar.
Hussey hinted that Spain would offer Nicaraguan territory and the Algerian port of Oran for
the Rock, as well as money “almost without limitation.” But Cumberland was not authorized
to respond.7 Instead, the next month Lord George Germain dispatched Hussey to Madrid
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with a letter indicating Britain’s willingness to have Floridablanca open a formal (though
secret) negotiation.
Germain hoped to remove Spain from the war by making a separate peace with her,
but not at the cost of Gibraltar. To involve the Spaniards in immediate talks, the colonial
secretary implied to Hussey that certain Spanish colonies were targeted for imminent attack.
Hussey reached Madrid on January 3, 1780 and conferred with Floridablanca, who informed
him that Charles III would never drop his pretensions to the Rock. “I plainly see that
[Gibraltar],..is the favorite object in the present war,” the priest reported to Germain. “The
whole nation has it constantly in sight....chiefly with the view of removing the stain of a
foreign possession within the kingdom.”8 By January 31, Hussey was back in London.
The British Cabinet met soon afterward and decided that George III might consider
exchanging Gibraltar for Puerto Rico, Omoa, Oran, a separate peace, Spain’s promise to
abandon the American colonists, her renunciation of all ties to France that might involve her
in future hostilities with Britain, and more than two million pounds. Hussey promptly wrote
Floridablanca on February 16, venturing his opinion that if Spain began negotiations with
Britain on the basis of the 1763 Treaty of Paris, the latter would eventually agree to discuss
the cession of Gibraltar in return for a separate peace. Subsequently, Floridablanca addressed
a meeting of the Spanish Council, which agreed on February 28 to undertake negotiations
with the British.9
Vergennes was not apprised of Madrid’s decision, but after the Spanish navy’s
catastrophic defeat off Cape St. Vincent in January, he suspected the worst. On March 31
he warned Montmorin, “Anything is possible. Now is the time to redouble your vigilance.”
His alarm was justified; three days earlier, Hussey had notified Floridablanca that he and
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Cumberland, the newly-appointed British plenipotentiary, would sail immediately for Lisbon
en route to Madrid.

Not until April 14 did the Spanish minister tell Vergennes that

negotiations were taking place. Floridablanca’s purpose in notifying the French was twofold:
to keep his ally’s trust, but even more to pressure France to support Spanish campaign
plans.10
Cumberland and Hussey set sail from Portsmouth on April 28, reaching Lisbon
nineteen days later. The Englishman waited there while Hussey rode on to Aranjuez to brief
Floridablanca. Arriving on May 28, the priest explained to the foreign minister that Germain
had forbidden Cumberland to enter Spain unless he received prior assurance that procuring
the cession or exchange of Gibraltar or Minorca was not Madrid’s aim. Of course, this was
Floridablanca’s chief motive for fighting the war in the first place, but Hussey chose to
overlook that fact. He beckoned Cumberland onward, rationalizing that the envoy had
traveled too far to turn back without giving the negotiation “a fair tryal.”11
When Cumberland received Hussey’s summons on June 6, his path was far from clear.
The priest had not given the guarantee he sought; by rights Cumberland should have returned
to London. But with his diplomatic reputation at stake and believing that Britain’s need for
peace transcended the letter of his instructions, he opted to join Hussey in Aranjuez. There
Cumberland met Floridablanca, and for two days they talked, the Spaniard referring to
Gibraltar at every opportunity, the Englishman changing the subject with equal finesse.
Negotiations broke off on June 22, the two men having failed to find any common ground.12
They did not meet again until September 2. During this second session, it finally
dawned on Cumberland that unless Britain surrendered Gibraltar, peace with Spain would be
impossible. (Some in the British Cabinet were then willing to pay that price, but public
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opinion forbade it.)13 Floridablanca grew increasingly frustrated at the stalemate. Finally he
elected to bypass Cumberland and deal directly with London through Hussey. On October
14, the priest stood before the British Cabinet and delivered Spain’s ultimatum: no Gibraltar,
no peace. Madrid had agreed not to mention the Rock in preliminary discussions with
Cumberland, Hussey admitted, but Floridablanca had fully intended that a secret arrangement
be made simultaneously by which Britain would cede or exchange Gibraltar to obtain peace.
For “without such cession or exchange,” the minister insisted, “it would be impossible that
the peace should be lasting.”14
By the end of Hussey’s speech, Cumberland’s masters understood Spain’s “trick and
chicanery” as clearly as he. Furious at having been hoodwinked so neatly, they resolved that
“no further step should be taken in this Business for some time.” Two months later, they sent
Hussey back to Spain with the British response: that making Gibraltar’s return a sine qua non
of peace “is in effect to break off the negotiation.” When Floridablanca learned of Hussey’s
report, he would not even let the Irishman come to Madrid to present it.15 Instead, he ordered
him back to London with the reply that the Cabinet’s refusal to part with Gibraltar “is to us
i

an undeceiving proof that Great Britain does not desire to be the friend of Spain, nor indeed
never can whilst this apple of discord subsists between both nations.”16
The gamble had failed. On February 14, 1781, Lord Hillsborough recalled Cumber
land from Spain. Father Hussey moved to the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) in September,
there to spend the rest o f the war. Their effort to reconcile Madrid and London had
foundered on the rocks of Spanish acquisitiveness and British fear of popular outrage. The
two powers distrusted each other even more now than in 1779. Britain’s only consolation
was that Cumberland’s mission had briefly upset the Bourbons’ diplomatic harmony, while
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Spain had used the negotiations to secure French assistance in future military operations—of
Spain’s choosing.17
On the world stage of the American Revolution, the Hussey-Cumberland mission was
obviously a mere sideshow. But it revealed clearly how expendable the American rebels were
in Spain’s eyes.

To John Adams, the colonies’ separation from Britain was far more

important to France and Spain than any concession that the British could make, “So that
America need not be under any apprehensions of being deserted.”18 He was wrong; for
Gibraltar, Spain would do whatever was necessary.
* * *
Spain’s determination to obtain Gibraltar at any cost also fueled the Spanish navy’s
aggressive attitude toward neutral shipping near the Rock. Any vessel passing through the
straits after June 1779 might be seized on suspicion of carrying supplies to the besieged
British garrison on Gibraltar. Spain’s indiscriminate harassment of neutrals brought no
reprisals, however, until her coastguards herded the Concordia, a corn-laden merchantman
bound for Marseilles, into Cadiz in January 1780. The ship was the property of a Russian
company; its seizure prompted an angry letter from Catherine II to Madrid. But Spain
compounded the insult the following month by detaining another Russian vessel, the Malagabound St. Nicholas, and selling all of its cargo.
Now Catherine ordered the immediate armament o f five frigates and fifteen ships of
the line to protect her merchant fleet. And to strengthen her voice in defense of neutral
shipping, the empress issued a Declaration of Armed Neutrality on February 28.19 This
document invited other European neutrals to join Russia in demanding a narrow definition of
contraband for the duration of the American conflict, with freedom of navigation through
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belligerents’ coastal waters to prevent the warring powers from snatching merchant ships on
pretext of chasing smugglers. Denmark and Sweden quickly subscribed to Catherine’s plan,
followed later by Prussia, Austria, Turkey, and the Two Sicilies. In the end, even Britain’s
former ally Portugal joined the “League of Armed Neutrality.”20
Ostensibly, the League was created in response to Spanish provocation, and
Floridablanca understandably viewed it as an instrument to thwart his country’s ambitions.
He therefore ordered more liberal regulations for neutral trade on March 13, then dismissed
the St. Nicholas affair as an accident and released it and most other neutral ships held in
Cadiz.21 Besides its predictable effect of placating the Russians, this course furthered Spain’s
maritime interests. The nation lacked sufficient merchant shipping to meet its needs, thus the
use of neutral vessels would allow Spaniards to obtain raw materials with both military and
peacetime utility. The delivery of such goods was precisely what Britain sought to end by
arguing for a broad definition of contraband.22
As the League gained adherents and strength through 1780, it became obvious that
its target was not Spanish expansionism, but British seapower. By January 1781, a dismayed
Lord Sandwich forecast that if Catherine and her League initiated active hostilities against
George in, the British empire would disintegrate and “we shall never again figure as a leading
power in Europe.” Floridablanca noted the same shift of focus and gleefully took full credit
for the formation of the Armed Neutrality.23
Struggling to break out of its growing isolation, Britain offered to cede Minorca to
Catherine R The North ministry calculated that in defending the island against an expected
Spanish attack, Russia would likely be drawn into the fray—on the side of Great Britain.
While Catherine appreciated the prospective benefits of a Mediterranean colony to Russia,
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the risk of war was equally plain. So she refused the cession, protesting, “The bride is to
beautiful; they want to deceive me.”24 The League retained its anti-British orientation for the
remainder of the war.
*

*

*

The Armed Neutrality arrayed most of Europe in hostile wariness toward Britain, but
the United States hoped for a more positive commitment from the power most likely to
intercede in its behalf. On September 7, 1779, a new French minister, the Chevalier de la
Luzerne, rose in Congress and read a letter announcing Spain’s declaration of war.25 The
delegates reacted at once. To plead America’s case for Spanish recognition, they selected
John Jay, their thirty-three-year-old president from New York, to go to Madrid and win over
Floridablanca. Jay and his private secretary William Carmichael set sail on October 20 aboard
the frigate Confederacy. Three months later they docked in Cadiz, and on April 4, 1780 a
mule-drawn carriage drew Jay into the Spanish capital.26
From a practical standpoint, Congress might have made a happier choice. Jay spoke
not a word of Spanish; and as Floridablanca was equally unskilled in English, Carmichael had
to act as interpreter between them. But a language barrier was the least of Jay’s problems.
During Jay’s voyage across the Atlantic, Charles III in Madrid had decided not to recognize
American independence until the British monarch had done so. Consequently, the Spanish
court which Jay would follow between its four seasonal residences for two years never
received him formally as the accredited representative of a foreign power.27
But Jay persisted, and after drafting a voluminous report on “the civil and military
state of the American provinces” for Floridablanca, he obtained an audience with the Spanish
minister on May 11 at Aranjuez. Floridablanca listened as Jay argued the merits of a potential
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Spanish alliance with the United States. Then he replied in geopolitical terms. The one
obstacle to such a treaty, he said, “arose from the Pretensions of America to the Navigation
o f the Mississippi.” Spain had previously granted the rebels free use of the river—as a
temporary measure—to bolster their war effort against Britain. Jay’s instructions encouraged
him to obtain permanent free passage for Americans on the Mississippi, as well as a river port
on Spahish soil, below the thirty-first parallel. Such expectations made Floridablanca uneasy,
since he knew that Charles ID would never relinquish (or consent to share) Spanish rights to
that river.28
Early in Jay’s mission, it became clear that Spain sought exclusive possession of the
Gulf of Mexico as well.29 Americans took less exception to that claim, for plainly Madrid’s
defensiveness about gulf navigation was calculated “to prevent the united States [and others]
from giting too near their Strong Box” of Mexico. But the Mississippi was the sole outlet to
the sea for American farmers in the trans-Appalachian region. Forbidding them to use it
would stifle the colonists’ westward expansion and, by implication, their prosperity. As Jay
informed one Spanish agent, “The Americans, almost to a man, believe that God Almighty
has made that river a highway for the people of the upper country to go to the sea by.”30
His conviction on this point would sustain Jay through protracted financial hardships.
Floridablanca tried to break Jay’s resistance to Spanish demands by withholding payment on
his bills until Jay agreed to surrender America’s claims on the Mississippi. But the American,
already miffed that Spain had declared war “in a manner not very civil to our independence”
and was raising British hopes by her delay in recognizing the United States, grew daily more
convinced that “we should retain and insist upon our right” to the river’s navigation.31
By September 1780, however, Jay acknowledged that the impasse over the Mississippi
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was the primary obstacle to a Spanish-American treaty.32 The Spanish government was
coming to the same view and (hoping also to pressure British agent Richard Cumberland into
greater compliance over Gibraltar) decided to make an overture to Jay through Don Diego
de Gardoqui, a Bilbao merchant. Gardoqui offered the United States $150,000 in credit,
obliquely predicating the loan on American flexibility on the Mississippi question.33 With this
proposition on the table, Floridablanca invited Jay to a meeting at San Ildefonso on
September 23. That evening, when Jay broached the subjects of alliance and the Mississippi
as usual, the Spanish minister showed some irritation. To the American’s request for a treaty
on the basis of the Franco-American pact of 1778, Floridablanca retorted that that was
impossible; French and Spanish interests in America were so different that separate
agreements would be necessary. Besides, he added, Charles III was insulted that the French
government had neither informed him of, nor invited him to sign, the 1778 accord. Therefore
Spain would make an alliance with the rebels at a time of her own choosing. With regard to
the Mississippi, Floridablanca continued angrily, “unless Spain could exclude all Nations from
the Gulph of Mexico, they might as well admit all.” He personally ranked the Mississippi’s
navigation as “the principal Object to be obtained by the war, and that obtained he should be
perfectly Easy whether or no Spain procured any other cession.” Not surprisingly, the
meeting ended on a note of rancor.34
By late 1780 the fortunes of war had deserted the Americans. Cornwallis roamed at
will through the South, brushing aside any rebel detachments that dared oppose him. Far
away in Paris, Franklin blithely predicted that Madrid would be above using the colonists’
distress to pressure them into yielding important objectives. Nor should Congress allow them
to. Consider the Mississippi River question, he went on:
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Poor as we are, yet as I know we shall be rich, I would rather agree with [Spain]
to buy at a great Price the whole of their right on the Mississippi, than sell a Drop
of its Waters. A neighbour might as well ask me to sell my street Door.35
Jay knew the Spaniards better and had no expectation that they would sell, but the point soon
became moot anyway.

For Georgians and South Carolinians in Congress feared the

imposition of a uti possidetis peace at any moment. In November they moved to authorize
Jay to barter away America’s right to the Mississippi, in exchange for Spain’s recognizing
American independence and increasing her financial support. James Madison fought hard to
retain the existing orders and thereby protect Virginia’s charter rights to the Mississippi. But
the Georgians’ and Carolinians’ panic carried the day. When the military situation did not
improve measurably in the ensuing months, Congress issued new instructions to Jay on
February 15, 1781, permitting him to negotiate away America’s claims to the western river,
provided a free port were made available to her citizens somewhere along its length.36
It seemed a heavy price to pay for alliance with a power already embroiled in the war.
“No other Congress will surrender all as this has to an ally,” growled Govemeur Morris, and
Jay concurred:
There was and is little reason to suppose that such a cession would render
[Spain’s] exertions more vigorous or her aids to us much more liberal....The
cession of this navigation will, in my opinion, render a future war with Spain
unavoidable, and I shall look upon my subscribing to the one as fixing the
certainty of the other.37
Nevertheless, when word of the new policy reached him in July, he faithfully transmitted it
to Floridablanca. His demands finally met, the Spaniard stalled for another two months before
receiving Jay at San Ildefonso on September 19, 1781; there he asked the American to put
on paper “the outlines of the proposed treaties” of alliance. Jay presented these three days
later, conceding America’s abandonment of her Mississippi River claims below 31° north
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latitude and offering mutual guarantees of territory in exchange for Spanish recognition of the
United States and formal military alliance with them.38 The problem of justifying the
relinquishment of the Mississippi navigation to its constituents “appeared to Congress in a
serious Light/’ Jay wrote. Because its loss could only be compensated by the advantages of
overt Spanish alliance and recognition, he reasoned,
if the acceptance of it should, together with the proposed alliance be
postponed to a general Peace, the United States will cease to consider
themselves bound by any Propositions or offers which I may now make in
their Behalf.
This final, crucial stipulation was Jay’s own. Congress had given up the river without
conditions, but eagerly embraced Jay’s addendum when he reported it.39
Events proved that Jay had acted wisely indeed. For the rest of the year “the most
profound silence respecting our propositions” reigned in Madrid. By January 1782 even
Franklin in Paris was frustrated. “I am much surpris’d at the dilatory reserved Conduct of
your Court,” he told Jay. “I think they are shortsighted & do not look very far into Futurity,
or they would seize with Avidity so excellent an Opportunity of securing a Neighbour’s
Friendship, which may hereafter be of great consequence to their American Affairs.”40
Clearly, the government of Charles III had more serious difficulties with American
independence than simply the navigation of a river.
More distant onlookers such as John Adams found Madrid’s delaying tactics “totally
incomprehensible,” but Franklin grew increasingly certain that Spain did not think American
friendship worth cultivating. In March 1782, six months after offering the Mississippi to
Floridablanca, Jay wrote to Franklin expressing his disgust:
As to this Court their system...with Respect to us, has been so opposite to the
obvious Dictates of sound Policy that it is hard to devine whether any Thing
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but Experience can undeceive them. For my Part I really think that a Treaty
with them daily becomes less important to us.41
His mission to Spain had been “one continued series of painful perplexities and
embarrassments,” and Jay concluded at last that America should settle for her existing treaty
with France. The news of Poure’s 1781 raid on Fort St. Joseph, breaking at the same time,
swung Congressional leaders at home to Jay’s point of view. “I beleive with you,” Secretary
for Foreign Affairs Robert R. Livingston told him, “that the Court of Madrid does not wish
to enter into engagements with [us] during the war ” Spain’s insatiable appetite for territory,
combined with her truculence at the negotiating table, had cooled the ardor of her most
persistent suitors.42
By the end of April, Franklin, too, had heard enough excuses. “Spain has taken four
Years to consider whether she should treat with us or not,” he wrote Jay. “Give her Forty.
And let us in the mean time mind our own Business.”43 Jay could do more good at his side
in the coming negotiations with the British, Franklin believed, so by mutual agreement they
terminated the fruitless mission to Madrid.
Late in June 1782, Jay arrived in Paris to begin the arduous work of winning peace.44

ALMOST PERFECT:
Spain’s Climactic Campaigns, 1781-1782

Spain being now at war with Great Britain to gain her own objects, she
doubtless will prosecute it full as vigorously as if she fought for our objects.
John Jay to the President of Congress,
October 3, 17811

Early in the autumn of 1780, James Madison wrote a letter to a friend in which he
analyzed Spain’s war effort and found it sadly misdirected. “It would be much more for the
credit of that nation as well as for the common good,” he reasoned, “if instead of wasting
their time & resources in these separate and unimportant enterprizes, they would join heartily
with the French in attacking the Enemy where success would produce the desired effect.”
Spain’s adventures in Nicaragua and Louisiana were hardly calculated to win the approval of
a young rebel politician from Virginia. But the following year, Spanish forces would
undertake a series of offensives that even Madison later admitted had brought “substantial
advantages” to his country.2
As 1781 began, Spain’s leaders knew that their resources were dwindling, and with
them Spain’s momentum. Vergennes made it clear that the French felt the same imperative:
“Everything urges us to end the war; the means for waging it daily decrease, and the
European situation may change at any moment.”3
Unknown to the Bourbons, one British statesman was even then drafting a proposal
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to lure Russia into the war, to act exclusively against Spanish interests. Richard Oswald’s
scheme initially called for Russian forces sailing from Siberia “to make a compleat conquest
o f the Spanish settlements on the coast of [South America],” and eventually of most of
Mexico and Peru as well. By April 1781 he had modified his idea to include five or six
thousand Russiaii troops garrisoning New York—freeing redcoats there for operations
against the Spaniards in Nicaragua—while Britain granted Catherine II a free hand in Mexico
and California. Neither plan ever received governmental sanction, but both demonstrate that
Britons viewed the vulnerability of Spain’s empire as a bargaining chip with which to attract
potential allies and to frighten Madrid into seeking peace.4
Spanish operations in North America got under way slowly in 1781. The capture of
Fort St. Joseph on February 12 was Spain’s only military encounter of the winter. Her inertia
in America stemmed from two sources: a late spring and Madrid’s preoccupation with
European affairs. Gibraltar in particular looked promising for Spanish arms. Britain’s
garrison there had withstood eighteen months of siege and had received no replenishment
since Rodney’s convoy the previous winter.

Floridablanca’s treaty with the sultan of

Morocco in January 1781 cut Gibraltar’s 7,000 defenders off from food and munitions. But
more important militarily, it also deprived them of any news about Spanish plans against the
Rock, and simultaneously allowed Spain to redeploy some troops then garrisoning Ceuta and
Melilla.5
The Spanish navy expected Britain to attempt another relief of Gibraltar. Thirty-two
ships of the line from Cadiz took up station near the Rock on February 6, this time prepared
to challenge a sizable British convoy. Indeed, they outnumbered Vice-Admiral George
Darby’s fleet of twenty-eight, which left Portsmouth on March 13 escorting ninety-seven
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supply ships bound for Gibraltar and hundreds of merchantmen for the West Indies. But bad
timing nullified Spain’s best efforts. Her fleet, carrying two months’ provisions, had not
counted on foul weather delaying Darby’s arrival. In April the entire Spanish force hurriedly
put into Cadiz to resupply, but as they lay at anchor on the twelfth, the British convoy sailed
past them and reached Gibraltar unmolested.6 Twice now, Britain had revictualed the Rock
without loss; but what was unforgivable, the Spanish navy then let Darby slip out of Gibraltar
Bay and return to England without firing a shot. The passivity for which Spain was notorious
had cost her again.
In the larger scheme of the war, Darby’s expedition and the force it required hurt
Britain deeply, although Spain herself did not reap the benefits. For when Darby elected to
take his entire fleet to Gibraltar, he left no squadron to guard the Channel in his absence. This
oversight enabled French admiral the Comte de Grasse to depart Brest in March with twentysix ships of the line for the Caribbean and ultimately for America, where that fleet would
decide the climactic battle of Yorktown.

Opposition leaders in Parliament maintained

afterward that Darby should have dispatched part of his force directly to the West Indies, as
Rodney had done in 1780, before sailing for Gibraltar. But the British admiralty rightly
expected a substantial Spanish blockade around the Rock, and only through Darby’s good
fortune did his fleet appear unduly large for the task at hand.7 Eventually, Darby did send
some warships to convoy the West Indies merchant fleet, but only after Gibraltar was safe.
The British captains could not make good the delay, however, and Britain’s consequent
weakness in the Americas was to make 1781 her most disastrous year of the war.8
*

*

*

Meanwhile, the pendulum of Spain’s war swung back to America. Throughout the
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winter of 1781, Bernardo de Galvez had readied his forces for an amphibious assault on
Pensacola. His luck up to this point had not been good. The previous autumn he had
launched a coordinated attack on the city with forces from both Louisiana and Cuba, but on
October 20 a hurricane scattered the sixty-seven ships from Havana all over the Gulf of
Mexico, from Campeche to New Orleans.9 Disheartened, Galvez gave up for the winter.
By February 1781 he had organized for another try.

His 1,315 men boarded

transports in Havana on the fourteenth, sailed northward two weeks later, and forced an
entrance into Pensacola Bay on March 9 with Galvez’s flagship San Ramon leading the way.10
Taken by surprise, the British shore batteries had permitted a Spanish landing; now Galvez
could bring the weight of his superior forces to bear. Rapidly, his troops entrenched around
Fort George.
All this time, General John Campbell sat inside the fort and did nothing. Thinking of
Lord George Germain’s prewar warning that “the Floridas must not be left exposed to any
sudden attack,” Campbell must have mused ruefully that he had faced no other type for the
past year and a half. To him, West Florida was merely “an ill-fated comer of His Majesty’s
dominions,” forgotten by London, New York, and Jamaica alike.11
The troops under his command certainly were not hand-picked for vigorous
campaigning. Back in 1778, Germain had sensed the threat Spain posed to West Florida and
ordered General Clinton in New York to dispatch 3,000 soldiers to St. Augustine and
Pensacola. Although West Florida was clearly in greater danger of attack from New Orleans
and Havana, Campbell arrived in Pensacola with less than half of that detachment. Those
troops he did receive were a polyglot, ragtag force of Waldeck Germans, British regulars, and
loyalists from Maryland and Pennsylvania—1,220 men in all. Together with Pensacola’s male
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civilians and Negroes, 500 Indians, and 279 seamen off the troopships, they made a garrison
of some 1,800 defenders.12 These troops, in Germain’s view, were not sent to Florida simply
to await a Spanish attack. He wanted them used, particularly against New Orleans. Once
Spain entered the war, Germain lectured colonial officials on the need for action. “The vast
Extent and enormous Expence of the War will not admit of dilatory or languid Movements,”
he declared in 1780, but the exhortation was lost on Campbell, who had no speed in him.13
Nor did the attitude of his superiors in New York and Jamaica help matters. Despite
repeated injunctions from Germain to look to the safety of the Floridas and warnings from
Campbell that “we shall soon have a hostile visit made us,” Clinton insisted that Pensacola
was “in perfect safety” and continued to hoard British troops in New York.14 Admiral Sir
Peter Parker, too, considered West Florida a low priority. And because its protection
depended primarily on the British fleet at Jamaica, Parker’s neglect proved ultimately more
serious than Clinton’s.15
As weeks slipped by, Galvez lengthened his siege lines and amassed troops. A
detachment marching overland from Mobile added 905 men later in March, followed by a
flotilla from New Orleans carrying 1,637 troops in sixteen vessels. On April 19, Pensacola’s
lookouts spied twenty-two ships approaching; it was a combined force from Havana bringing
1,600 Spanish and 725 French regulars, along with 1,504 sailors. When this contingent
disembarked three days later, Galvez’s strength stood at 7,686 men.16 Never in the war had
Spain enjoyed such numerical superiority over her opponent.
Spanish and French gunners rained a Constant bombardment on Fort George as their
infantry pushed its siege works closer day by day; but the British garrison held firm until May
8. On that “unfortunate morning” a stray Spanish shell exploded near a British powder
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magazine in an important redoubt known as the ‘Half-moon.’ Seventy-two men perished
instantly as the redoubt erupted in flames, and British resistance collapsed when Galvez’s
veterans poured through the gap in the fort’s defenses.

Campbell surrendered

Pensacola—and with it West Florida—the next day.17
So stunning was the impact of the Half-moon’s destruction that British losses on the
whole were quite light: ninety died and forty-six were wounded. The Spaniards suffered
heavier casualties—Galvez himself was among the wounded—but proportionally their loss
was minuscule.18 At surrender ceremonies on May 9, 1781, Galvez paroled his 1,013
prisoners to the British port of Campbell’s choosing, on condition that the troops not transfer
to Jamaica or St. Augustine (bpth Spanish objectives) or serve “against Spain or her allies”
until exchanged. Given such freedom, and the fact that Spain and the United States were
technically not allied, Campbell logically opted to rejoin Clinton in New York.19
This fresh proof of Spain’s cynical self-interest raised a howl of protest from
Americans, especially New Yorkers such as John Jay. In self-righteous anger Jay chastised
Floridablanca for condoning bare-faced treachery, and for once the haughty Spanish minister
apologized. “It was ill done...[and] very unexpected,” he admitted, and promised to order his
generals to parole future British captives to Europe.20
Though the furor over the Pensacola garrison soon subsided, and Campbell’s troops
saw no action after arriving in New York, this incident did provide a revealing glimpse of
Spanish thinking.21 Of course, it was ironic that Galvez, a supporter of the colonists’ cause,
should find himself the agent of their latest betrayal by Spain. But he left Campbell that
fateful loophole out of carelessness, not malice, a fact that suggests how pervasive an
influence Madrid’s self-serving, expansionist world view exercised on Spanish leaders
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everywhere. Officials like Galvez internalized what Alexander Hamilton called Spain’s
“narrow & jealous” policies so completely that they became second nature.22
The aftermath of the battle of Pensacola illustrated the differing values attached to the
port by each side.23 British General Campbell was disgusted at the utter lack of support he
received from any quarter. “What interpretation can the whole bear,” he grumbled, “but that
[West Florida] was considered no object of national concern, and left as a gewgaw to amuse
and divert the ambition of Spain and prevent it from attending to objects of greater moment
and importance.” Truly, the colony appeared not to matter to Britain except as a base from
which to attack New Orleans. Economically it was a drain on British resources, and its
defense was difficult (and therefore neglected by Admiral Parker in Jamaica). In many ways
it was for Britain what Louisiana was to Spain: strategically important to restrain rival
empires, but otherwise worthless.24
Spaniards, on the other hand, were wild with joy at the news of Pensacola’s fall. In
Havana, three days of celebrations, Te Deums. and rifle salutes showed how much Galvez’s
victory meant for Spanish morale. The government had treated West Florida as the high
priority it was, calling in ships from Havana, troops and money from Mexico, and even a
regiment from the siege of Gibraltar to ensure its conquest. Naval and military coordination
reached a level unsurpassed by Spaniards in the war, prompting Campbell to marvel at the
obvious “importance of the conquest in the estimation of Spain.”25
Some modem historians treat Galvez’s campaign against Pensacola less as part o f the
American Revolution than as a separate Anglo-Spanish conflict. Yet Britain’s diversion of
troops from other American theaters to West Florida, the resources she invested (and
ultimately wasted) in strengthening Fort George, and the 147 artillery pieces she lost to Spain
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at Pensacola’s fall combined to cripple her war effort in America in 1781, especially in the
southern colonies.26
*

*

*

Within six months the effects of that British weakness became resoundingly clear at
Yorktown. Spain’s contribution to the allied campaign there was both strategic and financial.
Again Bernardo de Galvez, newly promoted to supreme command of the Bourbon forces in
the West Indies, played a crucial part. Washington and the Comte de Rochambeau, planning
to strike at Cornwallis in Virginia, had written the Comte de Grasse, the French admiral in St.
Domingue, requesting naval support. Rochambeau also asked de Grasse to bring 1,200,000
livres in specie to pay the French army. The latter sensed a chance for decisive intervention
against the British in America and proposed to take France’s entire Caribbean fleet of twentyeight ships of the line north to Chesapeake Bay. Spanish Vice-Admiral Jose Solano helped
by shifting a Spanish squadron to Cap-Frangais to protect the French merchantmen left in
port.27
Galvez had the power to block this decimation of his naval strength. Yet he not only
permitted it, but he also gave de Grasse 3,000 French regulars who had been on loan to
Spain. His aide, Francisco de Saavedra, worked closely with de Grasse in devising a strategy
for the Chesapeake campaign.28 Then, to obtain the needed funds, Saavedra and Solano
turned to the people o f Havana. They answered their appeal by raising 1,500,000 livres in
just one day. On August 5, 1781, laden with troops and silver, de Grasse sailed northward.29
In that same month, another Bourbon armada was threatening the English Channel.30
Though it, too, failed to land an invasion force, by its presence it prevented Britain’s navy
from matching French strength in the American theater. As a result, de Grasse easily
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mastered his two British opponents in the Battle of the Capes on September 5, and within
seven weeks, Yorktown fell.
Flushed with ambition after this spectacular victory, Washington begged de Grasse
to stay and assist in the capture of British-held Charleston and Savannah. “Whatever efforts
are made by the Land Armies,” he observed, “the Navy must have the casting vote in the
present contest.” Furthermore, he noted, the season was perfect for campaigning in the
South, and such a combination of forces would not easily be amassed again.31 But de Grasse
could not tarry in American waters beyond October, for the Spaniards insisted that he return
to the Caribbean to prepare for a combined Bourbon assault on Jamaica in 1782.32
So the same Spaniards whose aid had made Cornwallis’s defeat possible now
prevented his conquerors from making more of their unique opportunity. Jamaica was a
purely Spanish objective, yet Solano had made no threatening moves, or even feints, in its
direction during the three months of de Grasse’s absence.33 Madrid had no strategic interest
in the events transpiring at Yorktown; in fact, de Grasse’s whole Virginia adventure seemed
to Spain a mere distraction from the serious business of subduing Jamaica and East Florida.
Only Galvez’s personal interest in the project led him to release French ships and troops to
take part in it.
But whatever the reason, the plan worked to perfection. At Yorktown and nowhere
else, the American, French, and Spanish forces cooperated harmoniously, and the results were
suitably world-historic.34 Except for some isolated frontier skirmishes, the war on the North
American continent was over, and Spain had played its part in ringing down the curtain.
* * *
Even before West Florida fell to Spain in May 1781, Floridablanca had turned his
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attention back to Europe. A great plan was afoot to clear out that infamous “nest of pirates,”
British-held Minorca.35 That the island had not been targeted earlier in the war was a
welcome surprise to its governor, General James Murray; but Spanish patrols had cruised its
waters for years, filling Murray and his garrison of 2,700 with a grim sense of foreboding.
Long before Spain entered the conflict, the British on Minorca had imagined themselves in
imminent danger of attack36 But from a Spanish viewpoint, Minorca had neither the strategic
importance nor the emotional symbolism o f Gibraltar, Spain’s primary objective. It was, as
Floridablanca had said, a den for English privateers, and the humiliation of its loss in 1708 still
rankled in Spanish hearts. Its principal harbor, Port Mahon, was called “the finest and most
convenient in the world.” Yet the military threat that the island posed to Spain was negligible,
and Britain’s tenure there depended entirely on her retaining Gibraltar as Minorca’s lifeline.37
The Rock therefore seemed a logical focus for Spanish operations.
But Madrid hatched plans in the spring of 1781 for an expedition against Minorca.
Two distinct motives dictated this choice of objective. First and most important, British
diplomats had recently sounded the Russian court about buying Catherine II’s mediation
efforts by cession of the island to Russia.

That news leaked to Madrid, spurring

Floridablanca’s desire to seize Minorca while it remained in British hands. Second, the
Spanish minister wished to count a Mediterranean operation—close to home and therefore
chiefly a selfish objective—as Spain’s contribution to the Bourbons’ European campaigns for
1781.38 Once he persuaded Charles III of these twin virtues o f his scheme on March 13,
preparations for the attack went ahead in absolute secrecy, even from the French whose
cooperation was essential to its success.39
Minorca’s defenses certainly looked formidable enough. In Port Mahon lay the key
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to the island, Fort St. Philip, which Murray felt that he had done everything in his power to
make impregnable. To his request for supplies in 1779 Germain had responded by adding two
battalions and surplus provisions to Rodney’s fleet replenishing Gibraltar in January 1780.
The supplies got through to Minorca; the soldiers did not, thanks to General George Eliott
at Gibraltar, who detained them in the belief that his post was the more important to Britain.40
So the garrison was well-stocked but unsuspecting as Spain amassed ships and
manpower for the expedition. Their point of departure was to be Cadiz, rather than a
Mediterranean port, to deceive British spies into predicting a blow against the West Indies
or Gibraltar. They certainly fooled John Jay, and the Comte de Vergennes knew nothing
about their objective until June 29.41
The expeditionary force sailed on July 23, 1781, escorted by forty-nine French and
Spanish ships of the line bound for the English Channel. The Due de Crillon, a French general
in the service of Spain, led the force that landed on Minorca a month later and caught its
defenders completely by surprise. Murray’s men narrowly escaped a rout on that first day,
saving themselves only by a hasty retreat behind the walls of Fort St. Philip.42
Crillon’s troops should have made short work of Murray’s four battalions, but
Floridablanca’s planners had relied so heavily on deception and superior numbers that they
had sent no siege weapons with the expedition. Consequently, summer slipped into late fall
as the Spaniards ringed the fortress and waited for artillery to arrive. It looked as if another
stalemate like Gibraltar was in the making. But by November 11, just as Murray was gaining
confidence that “Crillon will find Fort St. Philip’s a harder nut to break than he imagines,” the
Frenchman had the guns he needed to begin the siege in earnest. Nearly 4,500 French troops
had joined him in the interim; added to 10,000 Spaniards and Bourbon control of the western
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Mediterranean, they sealed Murray’s fate unless London could somehow bplster his
overmatched garrison by a sizable reinforcement.43
The political will to succor Minorca was there, but the means were lacking.44 In the
autumn of 1781, Britain could not muster the ships to run the Spanish blockade around Port
Mahon, so Murray was left to fend for himself. In the absence of any relief from home, he
could hold out only as long as his men and supplies did. As at Pensacola, a stray mortar shell
proved the British garrison’s undoing at Minorca. This one destroyed the magazine con
taining Fort St. Philip’s medical stores, leaving the defenders helpless when scurvy appeared
early in 1782. Militarily the Bourbons had made scarcely a dent in the fort’s defenses, while
Murray had taken only 208 battle casualties. But after his final attempt to break out on Feb
ruary 4 failed, the British commander could count only 660 troops healthy enough to fight.45
These odds were too overwhelming even for Murray, who on February 6, 1782
surrendered Minorca to Crillon and his army. The Spaniards demolished Fort St. Philip and
paroled the English prisoners, with the same conditions that Campbell had received at
Pensacola—but this time Madrid stipulated that they return under Spanish supervision to a
British port in Europe.46 Floridablanca wanted no repetition of John Jay’s carping on Spanish
duplicity toward America.
Thus Charles III won another long-sought objective to crown a triumphant year for
Spanish arms. Spain’s conquest o f Minorca combined all the elements that she had used
successfully earlier in the war: shrewd single-minded planning, surprise, sea power, and the
ability to secure French cooperation for her own ends. Among the amphibious operations of
the eighteenth century, it was Spain’s one textbook campaign. The outcome—recovery of
a treasured Spanish outpost—pleased the revanchists in the government, while their king
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rejoiced in the small number of Spanish casualties.47
From anyone’s perspective Minorca was a glorious victory, yet its major result would
complicate and prolong the entire War of American Independence. For it convinced Madrid
to attempt an all-out assault on Gibraltar.48
* * *
If anything is surprising about Spain’s final attack on the Rock, it is that she waited
so long to strike a decisive blow. Gibraltar’s recovery had been Madrid’s primary reason for
entering the war; it absorbed for three years the bulk of Spain’s naval resources; its high
priority in the minds of Charles III and Floridablanca soured their relations with France; and
its very nearness made it a festering sore—impossible to overlook—that distracted Spanish
strategists from projects of greater military consequence in the Channel and the Americas.49
To an impartial observer, Gibraltar was simply a chunk of limestone occupying two
square miles on the periphery of Europe. Its only function in the eighteenth century was to
protect the Mediterranean trade; and as its strength was purely defensive, Britain could never
use Gibraltar as a beachhead from which to threaten the Spanish mainland.50 But its contin
uance in British hands since 1704 was an ongoing source of humiliation to the proud Bourbon
who reigned in Madrid. Clearly, beyond strategic considerations there was a strong emotional
component to what historians have labeled “a Spanish obsession” with regaining the Rock.51
From the day the first Spanish shell flew into Gibraltar in July 1779, the fortress
became a magnet for Spain’s troops, materiel, and warships because Floridablanca sensed that
Britain would never cede the Rock voluntarily. Faced with the Spanish minister’s resistance
to cooperating with France elsewhere as long as Gibraltar remained British, the Comte de
Vergennes gloomily called the Rock “an excellent ally of England.”52 American leaders were
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more caustic about Spain’s fixation on Gibraltar: James Madison dubbed it Madrid’s “hobby
horse,” while John Adams scowled, “What is the importance of it? A mere point of honor!
a trophy of insolence to England, and of humiliation to Spain!”53
The Rock’s defenders, for their part, liked their chances. Led by General George
Eliott of Havana fame, the garrison had numbered 5,512 when hostilities with Spain opened.
Reinforcements landed with Rodney’s and Darby’s relief convoys had swelled their ranks to
7,000 men by the time Spain launched her final assault in 1782. These troops combined
offensive elan (proven when they sallied from the Rock in November 1781 to spike the
Spanish guns) with a defensive armament (663 artillery pieces and 5 warships) that promised
to make any Bourbon effort to dislodge them a costly enterprise.54
Spain was up to the challenge, or so her leaders thought. Beginning with 15,000 men
besieging Gibraltar in 1779, she had, in three years, amassed nearly 40,000 troops from all
over Europe. In 1782, overall command of the siege fell to the Due de Crillon, fresh from
victory at Minorca. He saw the futility of bombarding the fortress from Spanish land batteries
and ships anchored two miles distant, a tactic which for a year had made Spain the butt of
jokes in the English press. The impossibility of a landward invasion, too, was readily
apparent.55
So Crillon held a competition for ideas through which he might conquer the Rock.
It was won by the Chevalier d’Arcon, a French engineer who proposed the construction of
ten floating batteries, equipped with an elaborate fireproofing system and bearing a total of
152 heavy cannon. These guns, pounding Gibraltar from half a mile offshore, would surely
destroy the garrison’s power to resist. In the six months it took to build the odd weapons,
an allied fleet of forty-nine ships gathered in Algeciras Bay to support them.56
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Finally, on September 13, 1782, the great assault took place, but it expired in utter
failure eighteen hours later. The British responded to d’Arcon's batteries with a hail of redhot cannonballs, which burned and sank all ten of the immovable craft, killing 1,500 of their
crewmen. Attackers and garrison exchanged forty thousand rounds of shot and shell on this
day alone, but the finality of Spain’s defeat was indisputable.57
Glumly the besiegers reverted to a blockade, for the possibility remained that
starvation might accomplish for them what cannon had not. But even this hope perished a
month later, as Admiral Lord Richard Howe at the head of thirty-four British ships of the line
sailed unopposed into Gibraltar’s harbor on October 16. Again Cordoba’s Spanish vessels
lay passive as a British convoy unloaded men and supplies that would sustain the Rock for
another year. This time the combined fleet, keeping a respectful distance, dueled briefly with
Howe on October 20 as he was departing, but there was no hiding the fact that after three
successive letdowns, Spain’s ‘blockade’ existed in name only.58
In the larger arena of the American Revolution, Gibraltar occupies a prominent place
because of the opportunity costs Spain inflicted on herself elsewhere to ensure its capture.
John Adams was not alone in concluding that the “immense force” that the Rock siphoned
away from Spanish power could have been used far more profitably in other arenas. He felt,
understandably, that “the American seas” would have been a better place for Spain to win
Gibraltar from Britain. But anywhere a Spanish army and fleet of even half the size that
besieged the Rock might have gone, they would have had a momentous impact on the war.
As it was, Gibraltar’s greatest effect on the Revolution was to divert British fleets to its relief
each winter, which seriously compromised their campaigns in America each succeeding
spring.59
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* * *
The news of Spain’s failure before Gibraltar reached England on September 30,
cheering the public but bringing scant relief to a government nervous about the fate of its
richest Caribbean colony, Jamaica. The conquest of this island, vaguely sought by Madrid
since Spain’s entry into the war, had been actively planned since August 30, 1780. At that
time Floridablanca had anticipated that an invasion force o f20,000 to 24,000 men and 46 to
50 ships of the line (nearly half of these French) would be required to achieve this object
during the 1781 campaign.
De Grasse’s absence in North American waters for much of that year had postponed
the attack until 1782, and when the plans were completed in October 1781, they were less
ambitious than Madrid had envisioned at first. Floridablanca had ordered forces from Cadiz,
Havana, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo— 11,000 men in all, with 4 ships of the line—to
rendezvous with the French at Cap-Fran^ais in late December. The attack was slated for
March 1782, with the land forces under Galvez’s command, the fleets under de Grasse’s.60
Lord North’s government, then in its last days, had dreaded a massive Bourbon
descent on Jamaica since 1779; Sandwich lived “in constant Apprehension of hearing that the
blow is allready struck.” On learning that Galvez and de Grasse planned to meet, forming a
flotilla of over 12 warships and 18,000 troops who could have only one target in the West
Indies, the First Lord had commissioned Admiral Rodney to prevent this union. Rodney at
that time was dangerously ill, but he had accepted the assignment and readied his fleet at St.
Lucia to meet de Grasse.
Galvez suffered some delays in reaching the rendezvous but pushed on, arriving to
find no sign of de Grasse, nor even news of his whereabouts. The details, when he received
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them, were grim. De Grasse had left Martinique for St. Domingue on April 8, but after
skirmishing with the British for three days near a cluster of islets called The Saints, he had
been crushed on April 12, 1782 in the climactic naval battle of the American war. Besides
costing France five ships of the line and de Grasse his freedom, this historic defeat ended
conclusively any Bourbon attempt to invade Jamaica in 1782.61
Nevertheless, Galvez had made good use of the interruption. Quickly he laid plans
to conquer British East Florida and the nearby Bahama Islands. Besides closing off the Gulf
o f Mexico to foreign encroachment for the first time since 1763, Spain’s capture of these
territories would slam shut the northbound channel preferred by British vessels leaving
Jamaica for America and Europe.62 This, in turn, might even make Jamaica expendable in
Britain’s eyes and convince her to barter it for peace.
British East Floridians had lived since 1779 in fear of imminent assault by Spaniards
from Havana. At the beginning of 1782 a mere 436 redcoats and 300-odd militia stood ready
to defend the colony. Its capital, St. Augustine, was strongly fortified but inhabited mostly
by transplanted Minorcans of uncertain loyalty. And with Governor Patrick Tonyn battling
his own militaiy commander for control over East Florida’s defense, the path before Galvez
seemed clear. His intelligence service even learned that Minorcans from south of St.
Augustine would help him. But for reasons not fully explained, Galvez had spared East
Florida and turned instead against the Bahamas.63
Uncharacteristically, Galvez had declined to lead the raid on New Providence, the
chief Bahamian island, in person. Instead he had deputized Juan Manuel de Cagigal, the
captain-general of Cuba, to take 2,500 troops along with 3 American frigates and seize the
port of Nassau there. This Cagigal had done without delay, reaching Nassau on May 6, 1782
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and so intimidating its garrison of 348 men that their governor, General John Maxwell,
surrendered two days later without having fired a shot.64 Though Spain’s tenure in the
Bahamas proved to be temporary, CagigaTs success there had raised hopes for the coming
expedition to Jamaica.
After Spain’s defeat at Gibraltar, planning for that invasion resumed. This time it was
aided by the French, who wished to coax the Spaniards away from further vain efforts against
the Rock. The plan reverted to the large-scale attack Floridablanca had sought in 1780.
When gathered to strike, this force was to include 25,000 soldiers and 75 ships of the line
under Admiral d’Estaing.65
Britons thus had good reason to worry, both in London and in the Caribbean. Despite
the progress of peace negotiations, fears persisted in Parliament that a gigantic Bourbon
armada was about to seize Jamaica, which would destroy Britain’s position in the West Indies
forever. Floridablanca played on these concerns and even exaggerated the British claims,
hoping—as always—to achieve some concession without risking a battle. But the signing of
the preliminary peace accords intervened on January 20, 1783, leaving the recovery of
Jamaica, like that of Gibraltar, an unfulfilled Spanish dream.66
The significance of these Jamaica plans to Spain’s war effort is twofold. First, the
projected campaign of 1782 led directly to de Grasse’s disaster at The Saints and the loss of
Bourbon naval mastery over Britain for all time. But a second point is even more telling. In
plotting, as though it were its right, the recovery of a colony lost 125 years earlier, and from
which all ties to Spain had been obliterated, Madrid gave a final proof that irredentism and
imperial expansion were the twin forces driving Spanish policy in the American Revolution.

A DIALOGUE OF MAPS:
Spain and the Peace Negotiations, 1782-1783

All nations it is to be feared will wait for Spain, and
thus prolong the evils of war to unnecessary lengths.
John Adams to John Jay,
March 28, 17811

In the peace talks of 1782-1783, Spain remained the wild card she had been during
the war, wrecking several French and British proposals before finally agreeing to a peace
settlement which still saw her gain more land than any other combatant except the new United
States.

Not that her fickleness and adamancy were unexpected; both Frenchmen and

Americans who had dealt with Madrid foresaw the trouble Spain would cause in the negotia
tions. It was only the manner and extent of her acquisitiveness that awaited demonstration.
As early as February 1780, the Comte de Montmorin had predicted complications
were Spain to join France at a peace conference. A meeting with Floridablanca in March
1782 only strengthened him in that opinion, as the Spaniard’s distaste for the Americans
flared into open contempt. Shouting repeatedly that the rebels would always be English at
heart, Floridablanca frightened Montmorin into warning Vergennes about
the absolute carelessness or even the repugnance of Spain to the establishing
the independence of America. If it is so marked now, what will it be when
Spain succeeds in taking Gibraltar? Then the war will have no other object
than that same independence, which she now regards with so much
indifference and perhaps fear. I confess, monsieur, that this idea torments
me.2
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As a peace conference grew imminent, American diplomats realized the danger implicit in this
Spanish attitude. Before leaving Madrid, John Jay had counseled Secretary Livingston that
France was ready for a peace, but Spain was not; Charles IE’s eyes were “fixed on Gibraltar.”
Livingston, intensely absorbed in the western lands question, was pessimistic about Madrid’s
store of goodwill toward the United States. “Spain may flatter herself with the hopes of
gaining that at a general peace by the favor of the mediators which she is unwilling to
purchase of us by the smallest concession,” he observed. But “the weak claims which Spain
may set up from the conquest of a few inconsiderable posts [e.g., Fort St. Joseph]... only serve
as arguments of unbounded ambition without establishing a right.”3 After all, Livingston
queried a short time later,
Will it consist with the dignity of his Catholic majesty to ask, for the short
space in which he has been engaged in the war, not only Gibraltar, but the two
Floridas, the Mississippi, the exclusion of Great Britain from the trade to the
Bay o f Honduras; while the other branch of the house of Bourbon, who
engaged early in the controversy, confines her demands to the narrowest
limits?
He thought not.
Yet those points and more appeared in a note of May 24, 1782, from Floridablanca
to Aranda, authorizing the ambassador to open peace negotiations with Britain and listing
numerous Spanish desiderata. John Adams spoke for many when he said in June, “I fear that
Spain, who deserves the least, will demand the most.”4
* * *
No sooner had John Jay reached Paris than he found himself once again confronting
the Spanish government, this time in the person of Aranda. The Conde, who impressed Jay
as “frank and candid,” had instructions from Floridablanca to discuss treaty matters with the
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American but not to conclude any agreement without first clearing it with Madrid.5
With this caveat in mind, Aranda received Jay in his study on Saturday morning,
August 3, 1782. Carefully acting the part of a private nobleman rather than a Spanish
negotiator, the Conde opened the meeting by spreading out on a table a French edition of
John Mitchell’s 1755 map of North America. To get a broad sense of where an eventual
Spanish-American boundary might be established, he asked Jay where he would draw the
dividing line in the west. Without hesitation, the American put his finger on the origin of the
Mississippi and traced the river’s course down to the thirty-first parallel, just north of New
Orleans.
Astonished, Aranda inquired if Jay’s idea was to rob Spain of West Florida. Not only
was it historically a Spanish possession, he pointed out, but Galvez had just spent three years
winning the colony back from the British. There followed a legalistic squabble about colonial
charters versus rights of conquest, after which Jay departed, inviting Aranda to mark his own
proposed boundary on the map. The Spaniard sketched a red line from western Lake Erie to
where the Kanawha River met the Ohio, then southward to a lake in western Georgia, east
o f the Flint River. “The idea that I carried in extending...[such] an authoritative line,” he
noted in his diary, “was to see the Americans come to more moderation.”6
The response he provoked on sending the map to Jay a few days later was anything
but moderate. Aranda’s line, Jay exploded, lay nearly as far from the Mississippi as it did
from the Atlantic Ocean. Jay showed the map to Franklin, who asserted, “My conjecture of
that court’s design to coop us up within the Allegany Mountains is now manifested.”
Together they appealed to Vergennes against the magnitude of Spain’s claims.7 In answer,
the French minister offered his services and those of Joseph-Matthias Gerard de Rayneval,
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his English-speaking undersecretary, as mediators. On August 25 Vergennes asked Aranda
whether Spain would insist on the red line as a boundary. On hearing that she would not (as
long as the Mississippi remained inviolate), Vergennes proposed moving its Erie-Ohio
segment westward, to the mouth o f the Wabash River. To this Aranda assented with
reservations, but later, when Rayneval suggested a line even further west, he balked. Such
a border would bring the colonists too close to the Mississippi, the Spaniard argued.8
Through the end of August, discussions wore on, Aranda alternately regaling his guest
with tales of secret Spanish aid to America and coaxing him to exercise his plenipotentiary
status to secure for his nation a firm border in the west.9 But neither man was willing to
budge further on the boundary issue. Jay finally terminated the conference on September 10,
whereupon he and Aranda both turned to the British for more promising negotiations. Amer
ican diplomats considered themselves well quit of the Spaniards, for as Lafayette put it,
“Untill the Spanish Pencil is transported three Hundred Miles West Ward, There is No doing
Any thing towards Settling a treaty With that Nation.”10
* * *
The Spanish government faced an awkward prospect as it entered negotiations with
Britain in Paris that September. While perfectly sincere about bargaining for the recovery of
their various objectives (all of them territorial), Charles III and Floridablanca wanted Aranda,
their sole representative, to hedge on the fate of Gibraltar, the greatest prize of all. Crillon’s
great assault on the Rock was expected at any moment, and carried every hope of
succeeding.11
Ironically, at that point Spain might well have won Gibraltar at the conference table.
The new British ministry under the Earl of Shelburne, mindful of the costs attached to
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maintaining the Rock during the war, was prepared to cede it to Spain if a suitable equivalent
could be found in the West Indies. From Britain’s perspective, lush Puerto Rico was the
logical choice.
But the Spaniards would not hear of it. Floridablanca rejected an exchange of Puerto
Rico as impossible; the most he would permit Aranda to offer was the Spanish enclave of
Oran on the Algerian coast. The ambassador decided to approach Shelburne using the French
envoy Rayneval as his intermediary. When the Frenchman presented the idea of an Oran-forGibraltar trade in London, telling Shelburne that Charles III rated Oran an even finer harbor
than Port Mahon in Minorca, the British minister was incredulous. “I upheld the impossibility
of ceding [Gibraltar for Oran] ever so strongly,” he informed George III on September 13,
“that I could form no guess about their disposition regarding Puerto Rico.” The king was in
complete agreement, replying, “That Oran is a good port is quite new to Me, and I certainly
doubt it...Porto Rico is the object we must get for that fortress.”12
The notion of Oran as an equivalent for Gibraltar perished on September 30 as the
news of Eliott’s heroic defense reached London. At once Britain’s negotiating posture
stiffened. The surprise in London was that much greater, therefore, when on October 6
Aranda submitted to British negotiator Alleyne Fitzherbert a statement of Spanish peace terms
identical to the one he had offered before Crillon’s catastrophic defeat. Gibraltar, Minorca,
West Florida, and the expulsion of British loggers from Central America were still Spain’s
absolute conditions for ending the war.13 Furthermore, Aranda told the startled Fitzherbert,
Puerto Rico and Cuba were the “limbs of Spain,” and would never be sacrificed to British
demands for an equivalent for Gibraltar. The American war had taught him the value of those
islands, Aranda confided to Floridablanca:
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We must imagine that sooner or later in [Spanish] America there will occur
revolutions like those o f the English colonies, and that it is most important
that it be bound to the island capitals of Cuba and Puerto Rico, which by
virtue of their firm establishments will come to be the only worthwhile
possessions and thereupon will serve to bridle the continent.14
The calculating realpolitik subscribed to by high-ranking Spaniards like Aranda was one
reason the Spanish islands of the West Indies never came under serious threat of attack during
this war. Madrid knew their importance and defended them accordingly.15
/
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*

British statesmen were flabbergasted at Aranda’s ultimatum.

In disbelief, they

dispatched Fitzherbert to the French delegation to learn “whether the exorbitant Demands of
Spain are likely to be adhered to by that Court.” Vergennes professed himself shocked at the
extravagant terms but saw no means of altering them. Hastily he impressed on Fitzherbert
his conviction that “Spain should not continue to impede the Progress of a Pacification” and
added that he felt Madrid was secretly prepared to accept much less than it was asking. There
was no reason, he assured the furious Englishman, that Spanish greed must unravel the
delicate web of agreements that France and Britain had thus far assembled.16
Indeed, by early November the French and British had resolved all their differences
except the fate of tiny Dominica in the West Indies. With the American commissioners
embarked on private negotiations with Britain, there arose the possibility (earlier French
promises notwithstanding) that Spain might soon be left alone to face an enemy boasting
i

superior naval power and having nothing to distract it from ravaging her empire at will.
Suddenly Floridablanca demonstrated a willingness to barter. On October 30, he had sent
Aranda instructions to offer France the Spanish part of Hispaniola; in exchange, the French
should find an equivalent among their own possessions to cede to Britain, who would in turn
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give Gibraltar to Spain. Aranda presented this scheme to Vergennes a week later, with the
suggestion that sacrificing Corsica might fulfill France’s part of the arrangement.17
Vergennes reacted swiftly, rejecting the Corsican proposal out of hand. The last thing
Paris wanted was to see the British fleet acquire a base as near to France’s southern coast as
Britain itself was to her north. Vergennes could not so easily condemn the transfer of Spanish
Santo Domingo to French control, however. True, the colony was undeveloped and presently
useless. But if he refused it, he suspected that Floridablanca would promptly offer Santo
Domingo to the British in a direct trade for Gibraltar. (In fact, that had been the Spaniard’s
first instinct; as early as October 20 he had authorized Aranda to make such a trade.)18 So
at least one aspect of Floridablanca’s proposition remained on the table.
The British government, too, showed new signs of flexibility.

Heartened by

Vergennes’ prediction that Spain would make peace for a more reasonable price than she had
first demanded, the Cabinet met on November 7 to consider what Britain might pay to end
the war. However, its conclusion—that West Florida could be ceded to Spain and that British
loggers in Honduras might be more restricted in their activities—was as unrealistic as the
Spanish ultimatum had been, given Spain’s conquest of Minorca and the Bahamas as well as
West Florida.19 And the cession or exchange of Gibraltar was not mentioned.
At about this time, Benjamin Franklin, discussing Anglo-American terms in Paris with
Richard Oswald, inquired o f the British commissioner how the European peace talks were
progressing. Oswald replied that he feared Spain would pose the greatest obstacle to a treaty.
When Franklin hinted that Britain might accept trade privileges in the Spanish Indies as an
equivalent for the Rock, Oswald countered forcefully that nothing but territory—Puerto Rico
in particular—would suffice for that purpose.20

Ill

Nearby at Versailles, Vergennes5 frustration mounted. Spain would not make peace
without Gibraltar; Britain refused to consider its exchange. Now that the Bourbons’ great
assault had failed, the French minister had to break the impasse before Britain’s Parliament
reconvened on November 26.21 For once the popular clamor to retain the Rock commenced,
no British ministry would dare abandon it. The Spaniards were already threatening to seize
Jamaica in 1783; another year’s fighting loomed if Vergennes did not move quickly.
In desperation, he ordered Rayneval back to London on November 15 to learn what
Britain would demand in exchange for Gibraltar. Shelburne received Rayneval on the evening
of the twentieth, and they talked through the night. Finally the prime minister decided that
his government would consider parting with the Rock if Spain returned all the territories she
had captured during the war and arranged to give Britain either Puerto Rico, Martinique and
St. Lucia, or Guadeloupe and Dominica. As before, Puerto Rico headed Britain’s list of
preferences. Now, however, if Spain refused to yield it, France would have to sacrifice her
own islands to close the deal.22
Rayneval sent a courier to notify Vergennes at once of Shelburne’s offer, then
followed him across the Channel. He and Vergennes confronted Aranda on November 28 in
Paris. For seven hours they bullied and cajoled the Spanish ambassador. Gibraltar could not
be taken by force, they insisted, and Spain’s chances of capturing Jamaica (to trade it for the
Rock) diminished every week as Britain reinforced it. Finally, the Frenchmen’s entreaties had
their effect. An exhausted Aranda wrote down a compromise whereby Spain would restore
Minorca—but not West Florida—to Britain and cede Santo Domingo to France if the latter
gave up Guadeloupe and Dominica, in return for Gibraltar. Spain also expected the British
to evacuate their Central American logging settlements.23
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Seizing the new propositions, Rayneval hurried back to London. There Shelburne had
enjoyed comparable success, convincing the Cabinet to postpone Parliament’s opening until
December 5 and winning the king’s and the Cabinet’s support for his terms, despite vehement
protests by Viscount Keppel and the Duke o f Richmond. These two nobles, hawkish and
imperialistic in the best of times, were particularly aggrieved because the Cabinet had
approved generous peace terms for the Americans a few days earlier.24 To knuckle under to
the Bourbons as well by handing over Gibraltar—at any price—struck them as an infamous
act of betrayal. Little did Keppel or Richmond realize how dramatically their position would
be strengthened by Britain’s signing of a preliminary peace treaty with the United States on
November 30,1782. That act was to exert a powerful effect on the courts of Versailles and
Madrid and, most of all, on the British public.
*

Hs

*

The lone item in the Anglo-American preliminaries which concerned Spain grew out
o f John Jay’s unpleasant memories of Madrid.25 Back in October, Jay had remained angry
enough at the Spaniards to suggest that Britain employ her 20,000 troops still in North
America to recapture West Florida from them. Such a campaign would simultaneously have
hastened the evacuation of British-held New York and Charleston, while freeing Americans
living in the Mississippi valley from Spanish domination of the river’s mouth. Perceiving
these advantages, Franklin had quickly fallen in with Jay’s proposal; he cautioned only that
troops from New York’s garrison not be used directly against Pensacola lest Spain suspect
American complicity in the attack.26
Although planning went no further that month, the prospect of Britain recovering
West Florida loomed very real throughout the autumn of 1782. Jay’s second draft of a
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tentative Anglo-American peace treaty even included a secret “Separate Article” addressing
that possibility:
[I]n Case Great Britain at the conclusion of the present War shall recover or
be put in Possession of West Florida, the Line of North Boundary between the
said Province and the United States shall be a Line drawn from the Mouth of
the River Yaz[oo] where it unites with the Missisippi [sic] due East to the
River Appalachicola.27
This condition, retained in the preliminary Anglo-American treaty signed in Paris on
November 30, translated the southern boundary of the western United States almost a
hundred miles north of the 310 north parallel, where British diplomats agreed it should lie if
Florida remained in Spanish hands.28
The Yazoo’s mouth had, in fact, marked West Florida’s northern border since 1764,
but ownership of the land south of that point was no longer Britain’s to negotiate. By
offering America the territory below the Yazoo line, Richard Oswald neatly ignored the fact
of Galvez’s conquests in 1779. If put into effect, the treaty would even have handed the post
of Natchez to the Americans without Spain’s consent. Of course, no power in the war was
less likely to acquiesce in its hard-won prizes being disposed of so cavalierly, and when
Congress disclosed the terms of the Anglo-American preliminaries, Madrid at once voiced a
loud protest against the 31 ° line.29
Not content with dealing away Natchez, Oswald also granted America a western
boundary on the Mississippi and a full share in his nation’s right—established in 1763—to
navigate that river freely. At least on paper, then, Britain had given the United States clear
access to precisely that waterway which Floridablanca, Aranda, and Rayneval had striven so
diligently to prevent their reaching. This cession aroused such animosity in Spain that Madrid
closed the Mississipi to American shipping in 1784.30
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For reasons that will presently become clear, the Separate Article did not figure in the
definitive Anglo-American peace treaty.31
*

*

*

Rayneval arrived in London with Aranda’s note early on December 3 to a reception
vastly different than he had anticipated. Rumors of the government’s intention to deal away
Gibraltar had met leaks about the one-sidedness of the American peace preliminaries to create
a storm of popular resistance to any cession of the Rock. Nevertheless, the Cabinet met that
day and approved the exchange of Gibraltar with Spain. Since Madrid refused to yield West
Florida, Trinidad* Minorca, and the Bahamas were now to be demanded in addition to
Guadeloupe and Dominica. In a fury Keppel and Richmond denounced the plan, the former
threatening to resign if it were carried out. Richmond, for his part, told George III the
following day that he had accepted the American terms only to permit a harder line to be
taken against the Bourbons. He did not think anything could compensate Britain for the loss
of Gibraltar, “the brightest jewel of the Crown.”32 When Parliament reopened on December
5, Lord North rose in the Commons to argue the same point. While he would not state
categorically that the Rock must under no account be given up, North felt its uniqueness
should be fully recognized.
He believed, there were few things in the possession of Spain that could form
an adequate compensation for the loss of Gibraltar; she might indeed give
territory infinitely more extensive, and of more intrinsic value; but could she
give any other impenetrable fortress?
Charles James Fox spoke out with equal force against the proposed cession. In the war just
ending, he said, “Gibraltar had been of infinite use to this country, by the diversion of so
considerable a part of the force of our enemies.” That fortress, in his opinion, “was to be
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ranked among the most important possessions of this country; it was that which gave us
respect in the eyes of nations; it manifested our superiority.”33
The withering criticism leveled at Shelburne’s propositions took the Cabinet by
surprise and stunned Rayneval. In despair he wrote to Vergennes seeking direction about
Gibraltar. “Without that unhappy fortress,” Rayneval had felt for some time, “peace with
Spain would be infinitely easy.” Vergennes knew this better than anyone, and the signing of
the Anglo-American preliminaries now gave him a fresh inspiration. With the American
commissioners’ action a fait accompli, he could now inform Madrid with a clear conscience
that their precipitate and unexpected rapprochement with Britain had revived British spirits
and dealt a crippling blow to Spain’s hopes of recovering Gibraltar under any circumstances.
He authorized Rayneval to ask Shelburne what Britain was prepared to yield if France could
somehow induce Spain to back away from its demand for the Rock.34
This was more than wishful thinking on Vergennes’ part. Unknown to him and days
before the British and Americans had signed their pact, Floridablanca had sensed a shift in the
wind. Swallowing hard, he had admitted to Aranda on November 23, “It seems that the
whole obstacle to the conclusion of peace is Gibraltar.” Accordingly, he went on, Charles III
would like to know “what compensation or what considerable advantage Spain could draw
from the treaty, if perchance he should make the sacrifice of giving up such a desire.”35 When
Rayneval posed this question to Shelburne on December 10, it was the Earl’s turn to be
astonished. He had not counted on Madrid to listen to reason. Recovering himself the next
day, Shelburne suggested to the king that, in place of Gibraltar, Britain might offer Spain both
Floridas (or a West Florida with liberal boundaries) and Minorca. At noon on the eleventh,
the Cabinet met to discuss the proposals as Rayneval waited anxiously in the next room.
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Three hours later Lord Grantham, Shelburne’s foreign secretary, came out to notify
the French envoy of their decision. The peace terms to be offered to Spain were simple: the
cession o f Minorca and both East and West Florida. In return, Spain must restore the
Bahamas to Britain and guarantee the right of British loggers to cut wood in Central America
under regulations. Finally, France would be required to hand back Dominica.36
From a Spaniard’s perspective it was a paltry offer.

In essence, the Cabinet

acknowledged the conquests that Spanish arms had made and sought to buy back one lost
colony, the Bahamas, at the price of East Florida.37 Virtually nothing else would change.
British statesmen, therefore, were understandably skeptical whether Madrid would agree to
their conditions. Indeed, they had failed to convince even their own monarch that their course
was best. George III contended that “Peace is not compleat unless Gibraltar be exchang’d
with Spain,” and proposed to Shelburne that if Britain must retain the Rock in any case,
“Spain should have the two Floridas, or Minorca, but I would wish if possible to be rid of
Gibraltar, and to have as much possession in the West Indies as possible.”38 The king was
willfully ignoring public opinion here, a luxury that his prime minister could ill afford.
Rayneval wrote Vergennes on December 12 begging him to prevail on Spain to accept the
new British proposal. Otherwise, he predicted, Shelburne’s government would fall and all
hope of a quick peace would vanish. At the same time, Rayneval left Shelburne no doubt that
France was eager for Madrid “to close on any terms.”39
That was certainly Vergennes’ motive for calling Aranda to Versailles on the morning
of December 16, hours after Rayneval’s dispatch arrived. By stressing the critical importance
o f an immediate settlement for both Bourbon courts and presenting Britain’s proposed
equivalents for Gibraltar, Vergennes hoped to enlist the ambassador’s cooperation in
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petitioning Madrid to make peace on the basis of that offer. He little dreamed that Aranda
was invested with the power to decide for Spain on his own responsibility.
In point of fact, the Conde had no such license.

Nevertheless, flourishing

Floridablanca’s memorandum of November 23 that inquired what compensation Spain might
obtain for Gibraltar, Aranda took it upon himself to accept the British terms on behalf of his
king.40 Perhaps he placed a higher premium on the Gulf of Mexico (whose ownership he
thereby recovered for Spain) than on Gibraltar as a guarantor of his nation’s future welfare.
Certainly he sensed in Paris, as one could not from Madrid, the belligerent temper of the
British public and Shelburne’s tenuous hold on power. Whatever the reason and however
unauthorized his action, Aranda effectively ended the war in the instant it took him to
respond.
His answer cheered Vergennes immeasurably. The following day, the French minister
informed Montmorin of the settlement and brimmed with ideas about how best to make
Aranda’s agreement palatable to the Spanish court. With ample justification he lauded
Spain’s reacquisition of the Floridas as an achievement that would secure the mouth of the
Mississippi, and by extension New Spain itself, against Anglo-American expansionism for
years to come. Yet he surely presumed on Madrid’s credulity when he emphasized Spain’s
good fortune in obtaining Minorca rather than Gibraltar. No amount of rationalizing could
soften that blow.
Privately, Vergennes was simply relieved that France had not been forced to sacrifice
vital sugar islands, rumors of which had deeply tarnished his popularity in Paris. And as for
other French interests, was it not Britain’s continuing occupation of Gibraltar that poisoned
her relations with Spain and threw the latter into France’s arms in times of crisis? The
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Convention of Aranjuez notwithstanding, Vergennes had every reason to wish the Rock in
British hands.41
Meanwhile in London, the authors of the all-important proposal had resigned
themselves to a long wait. Shelburne and his Cabinet took it for granted that the Spanish
court would need to be consulted on an issue of such magnitude. They were therefore
stunned when Rayneval appeared on December 19 to report that Spain had accepted their
eleventh-hour offer of a peace without Gibraltar. King George rejoiced that a peace formula
had finally been arrived at, but he could not resist pointing out for the record, “I should have
liked Minorca, the two Floridas and Guadaloupe better than this proud Fortress....in my
opinion source of another War, or at least of a constant lurking enmity.”42 If only he had
shown such foresight in 1775.
The last court to learn of Aranda’s unexpected decision was his own. The news that
their ambassador had withdrawn Spain’s demand for Gibraltar was a terrible shock to Charles
III and Floridablanca, particularly the latter, who had now thought better of his order
directing Aranda to seek equivalents. On December 18 he rescinded it, but the damage had
been done. Vergennes’ flimsy defense of Aranda's course mollified Floridablanca not at all.
Nor did his explanation that the American commissioners’ accord with the British had
toughened London’s stand, forcing France to settle for less than she had hoped to extract in
the negotiations. In a huff, the Spanish minister declared that Vergennes’ ministry “was too
precipitate in beginning the war, and was equally so in their endeavours to conclude it.” His
Catholic Majesty was equally disappointed. In January 1783 he wrote to his nephew, Louis
XVI, that “my ambassador, knowing my heart’s tender sentiments for you, has allowed
himself to exceed my orders and pursue peace negotiations without insisting on the cession
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of Gibraltar.”43 American independence and Gibraltar in British hands were hardly the objects
that Charles III had entered the war to achieve.
With such exasperation the overriding sentiment throughout Madrid, it was by no
means certain that the Spanish court would ratify Aranda’s acceptance of the British terms.
After all, the fleet at Cadiz was still making preparations to conquer Jamaica. But with
Gibraltar defiant and France begging for peace, Spain’s prospects for further territorial gains
looked bleak. Midway through January her government sullenly approved the terms that
Aranda had independently accepted for it. He and Fitzherbert met at Versailles on January
20 to sign the preliminary treaty that ended the fighting.44
The Spanish court ratified the agreement with little dissent, but Floridablanca carefully
avoided thanking Aranda for his role in concluding it. Trying to emphasize its gains, the chief
minister publicly hailed the treaty as Spain’s most successful in two centuries, but it was
unpopular both at the court and among the Spanish people because it had failed to secure
Gibraltar, their main objective in the war. Not that Charles III had given up his claim to the
Rock. Floridablanca wrote after the war, ‘W e have given way on the matter of Gibraltar only
for the moment. We must get it back whenever we can, either by negotiation or by force if
war occurs.”45 Anyway, he insisted, by recovering the Floridas and closing the Gulf of
Mexico to foreign penetration once again, Spain had won a major foreign policy objective.46
Exactly what she had acquired in “the Floridas” was unclear. Both the preliminary
treaty and the later definitive version were maddeningly vague on that issue. Certainly Spain
was not bound by the terms of the Anglo-American preliminaries, and by right of conquest
she might regard the Floridas as stretching northward as far as the Tennessee and Ohio
Rivers.47 Like the Mississippi River question, this problem would haunt future diplomats.
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American statesmen of that day believed that Spain had profited handsomely by the
peace settlement. “The two Floridas and Minorca are more than a quantum meruit for what
this power has done,” John Adams sneered. Lafayette expressed regret that the Floridas had
fallen to Spain. “For ever the Spaniards Will Be Extravagant in their territorial Notions,” he
explained, “and Very jealous of the Encrease of American Wealth and Power. But it is Good
Policy for us, to Be Upon friendly terms With them.”48
That would be no easy task, as Madrid had little use for its new neighbors. Aranda
worried about “the menace of the revolutionary spirit represented by the United States,” and
Floridablanca made it plain that he considered American independence a “misfortune.” Only
at Lafayette’s insistence did he finally invite William Carmichael, John Jay’s former secretary,
to a diplomatic corps dinner on February 22, 1783. Six months later, on August 23, Charles
IQ received Carmichael officially as the charge d’affaires of the United States of America.49
Distasteful as that reception may have been for the king, it marked the beginning of
a constructive relationship between two undisputed victors of the American Revolution. One
key to the United States’ success in the war had been that the colonists took to heart
Washington’s admonition: “We shall find ample employment in defending ourselves without
meditating conquests.” Spain, too, was successful (by her own lights) because her leaders
meditated virtually nothing else. From the war’s opening shots in 1775 through Aranda’s
bold gamble in December 1782, it was Lafayette who best characterized the spirit that
compelled the Spaniards to act as they did. “They labour Under fits of territorial Madness,”
he said.50
With the signing of the definitive Treaty of Paris on September 3, 1783, the madness
ended.
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By then Charles III had but five years to reign. Aged seventy-two and content that
his gains in the American war had added luster to the glory of the realm, the king died quietly
on December 14, 1788. The Spanish empire stood at its greatest extent in two centuries.
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